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Central Eurasia

Military Affairs

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CIS/RUSSIA ARMED FORCES

CIS Veterans' Affairs Aide Interviewed

92UM1472B Moscow PATRIOT in Russian
No 37, Sep 92 (signed to press 15 Sept 92) p 4

[Interview with Prof Galina Zakharovna Demchenkova, head of the Department of Medical and Social Problems, by N. Gavrilov: "Pain Knows no Frontiers"]

[Text] Within the Committee for Internationalist Veterans Affairs under the Council of the Heads of Governments of the CIS Member States, there is a Department of Medical and Social Problems. It is headed by the Doctor of Medical Sciences, Prof Galina Zakharovna Demchenkova. What tasks does the department carry out? What has been done and what still remains to be done? What difficulties are in the way? The PATRIOT correspondent asked these question of Galina Zakharovna.

[Demchenkova] I would begin with the last, with the difficulties. In order to make them starker, let me give several figures. Some 546,000 men passed through Afghanistan. Of these, around 28,000 came home with injuries, maiming and concussions. Let me stress that they are all young persons still under 25.

And how the people suffered. Infectious diseases were contracted by 281,000 persons and some 123,000 came down with illnesses of the inner organs.

Those are terrifying figures! But they are made even more terrifying by the fact that you clearly understand: with the current state of affairs in the nation, we in public health cannot give the help needed. That is the main difficulty.

[Gavrilov] Is there no way out?

[Demchenkova] There is a way out, and not a hypothetical one, but quite realistic and sound from all views. We have worked out a program for the medical and social rehabilitation of the participants of local wars and conflicts. It is called the "Basic Directions for an Interstate Comprehensive Medical-Social Program for Protecting the Health and Rehabilitating the Internationalist Soldiers and the Members of Their Families for 1992-1995." A draft of the interstate agreement on this question has been drawn up and turned over to the CIS states...

[Gavrilov] How many different programs did we have in the USSR and now in new Russia! For housing, for food and for the various most essential matters. But nothing is happening with them. And won't this be the fate of your program, Galina Zakharovna?

[Demchenkova] I don't think so, but at least I am hopeful that it will be different. On what is this hope based? First of all on the fact that we are not alone. The public organizations are helping us greatly. I would also point out the role of the Church and personally of the

Most Holy Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Aleksiy II and Pitirim, metropolitan of Volokolamsk and Yuryev.

There has even been some progress on the state level.

What alarms me is this. Even through the words on agreement one can still see a certain half-heartedness: "It is a good program. Yes, everything must be done together, but...possibly, we will set up everything in our own republic." This is how they feel, for example, in Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan is also focused on "its own forces." With all due respect for independence, separating in this question would have lethal consequences. At present a number of the CIS states has medical rehabilitation centers. They are quite specialized and each one individually cannot provide the entire range of medical care. Unique cooperation is needed along with the possibility of using these centers by everyone needing this, regardless of the place of residence. The centers themselves recently in line with the general state of the economy are experiencing more and more various difficulties. I can say frankly that no one republic is capable of successfully overcoming them. Here there is only one way and that is the setting up of a unified interstate system for satisfying the needs of the internationalist soldiers for medical aid.

[Gavrilov] The press has already announced that the program mentioned by you exists. Could you describe it in a little more detail?

[Demchenkova] The program includes a number of areas. In the first place, it is essential to set up an interstate data bank on the questions of medical services. This requires the carrying out of regular sociological and medical-social research. Not to solve this problem means to be constantly in the dark. But a solution to this alone is beyond the forces of any one republic. There must be common efforts. Interstate ones. At present we lack reliable information on the individual health of the former soldiers. Those statistical data which are available (on the number of diseases, disability, temporary disability and so forth) are scattered. Moreover they at times are incompatible as each department counts in its own way. Complete data can be had only on the basis of an interstate [data] bank.

Furthermore there must be an interstate scientific research center for our problems. This has already begun working in St. Petersburg. Here the Military Medical Museum alone has over 21 million case histories of illness among casualties in wars. Of this number, over 450,000 are the case histories of persons who fought in Afghanistan. The center will work out a standard methodology, standard techniques of medical, psychological and social aid to all soldiers residing in any state in the CIS.

One of the most important areas of the program is the introduction of compulsory and voluntary medical insurance for the internationalist soldiers and the members of their families. Medical services, as much else in

our nation, are becoming ever more expensive. At present the treatment for one person costs an average of about 18,000 rubles. But what about tomorrow? One thing is clear and that is that medicine will not become cheaper...

We are placing great hopes on the fact that we will be able to set up an international school for the training and advanced training of specialists in the rehabilitation area (including psychologists) capable of providing specialist aid to the internationalist soldiers. At present we do not have a system for the training of such specialists on the state level. And the need for this is enormous. We often look to America as the model from which we supposedly should borrow. That is sometimes true but not always. But as for the concern there for the men who fought in Vietnam, Korea and elsewhere, we have much to learn. There all the problems are resolved on a state level. How else could this be? A man is sent to war by the state and it, when this man is wounded or sick, should not remain on the sidelines! But in our country this is at times precisely what happens.

The same Americans have long ago established that combat mental trauma has a negative effect for decades on the health of a man. And we, too, possess certain data which confirm their conclusions. Thus, an examination of pilots who fought for a year in Afghanistan showed that 40 percent of them had neurotic reactions, in 50 percent there were affective disturbances, in 56 percent there were asthenic disruptions and in 34 percent, vegetative-vascular dysfunctions.

In the international school which I have mentioned, we are counting on obtaining aid from the American, French and Finnish specialists. There is already a tentative agreement on this.

[Gavrilov] Galina Zakharovna, the scientific research center and the school about which you speak will be concerned with a range of questions related to the health of the internationalist soldiers. But certainly the "product" from these institutions will find wider user?

[Demchenkova] Certainly. Stress situations occur not only in a war. Unfortunately, they are in no short supply in peacetime. Any sort of emergency, production or transport accidents, natural disasters and other similar abnormalities effect a person with the same consequences as combat conditions. And here undoubtedly we need specialists like those who work with those in a war. In any event, much is similar here.

But let me continued about the program. I would like to draw attention to one other area of it and this is the necessity for establishing a foreign exchange reserve. This is necessary for treatment and for fitting prostheses for the international soldiers abroad, for purchasing medicines, medical equipment and modern technology in the prosthesis area.

[Gavrilov] It is impossible without foreign exchange?

[Demchenkova] Impossible. Our country makes prostheses. The Rus Center for Medical Rehabilitation and certain other organizations are working successfully in this area. But this is not enough. From the CIS countries over the last two years, some 120 persons were fitted with prostheses abroad... And this practice will be continued, for up to now not all those needing it are receiving the essential aid. I will not give figures but believe what I say: this problem is one of the most acute and it cannot be resolved without foreign exchange, at least in the near future.

There, in brief, are our difficulties. In conclusion I would like to say the following. No matter how powerful medicine is, it alone cannot give back health to those who lost it in a war. There must be concern for these persons on the broadest scale. Where a person works and how, what wage or pension he receives, under what roof he sleeps, what he eats—this and much else is crucial in the life of each of us. All of this can be sufficient and worthy only in the event that primarily the state and all of us, each individually, show proper understanding for the men who have gone through the war.

Problems With Draft System

92UM1478A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
18 Sep 92 p 2

[Article by Lieutenant-General Georgiy Shpak, chief of staff of the Volga Military District: "The Draft and the Law—Do They Always Conform in the Activity of the Local Authorities?"]

[Text] The leaders of the oblasts and republics on whose territory the district is stationed assembled at the staff headquarters a year ago, for the first time in several decades, when summing up the results of the draft. This representation was not only explained by the heightened interest of the local administrative bodies in the problems of the draft, but also by the stormy outburst of events of a political and national nature, in the course of which the military question has also been energetically discussed.

It was declared at that meeting that the oblasts and republics would be guided on issues of military policy by the directives of the center, with the participation of district structures. So how do those oral, gentlemen's agreements look today?

The district has overfulfilled the detail of the General Staff. The draft has been organizationally completed in Mordovia, Mariy El, Udmurtia and Kirov and Saratov oblasts. But these tasks were sometimes performed under great tension. The difficult socio-political situation in the Republic of Komi and in Tatarstan, for example, had a negative effect on the results of the draft. I have sent letters in the name of the military council of the district to the presidents and the chairmen of the Supreme Soviets of the republics in which I set forth

conclusions from an analysis of the past call-up, and asked that they be taken into account in the fall of this year.

The point is that a whole series of problems exists in the legal and standards support for the pre-draft training of the youth, along with manpower acquisition for the troops, whose resolution is not under the jurisdiction of the district staff. The parliaments of the Bashkir, Tatar, Udmurt and Chuvash republics, for example, recently promulgated decrees, individual provisions of which contradict the stipulated principles of manpower acquisition for the armed forces. The local authorities, on their own, have adopted resolutions on manpower acquisition using the draft resources of MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], civil-defense and military-construction units on their own territories, which has disrupted the plans for the movements of draftees and pushed the draft detail for the armed forces of Russia to the brink of non-fulfillment.

Letters and telegrams moreover came to the leadership of the district in the spring of this year—from the presidents of republics, the supervisors of administrative oblasts and from various public political organizations and movements in the region—that contained requests and appeals that actually urged us to violations of the existing draft procedure.

The transition to principles of a market economy has effectively halted the effect of Articles 17 and 19 of the Law of Universal Military Obligation. They placed on the managers of state enterprises and educational institutions the responsibility for preparing youth of pre-draft and draft ages. Today those leaders have no opportunity, as before, of paying for the preparation of school-age youth for service and carrying out draft-registration work in the local areas.

The passivity of bodies of law and order in seeking out and making liable those who evade the draft has increased.

It is essential to eliminate, as quickly as possible, the legal vacuum that has arisen. I am thus also sending an appeal—in the name of the military council of the district—to the Supreme Soviet of Russia to accelerate the preparation and adoption of the laws "Military Obligation and Military Service," "Alternative Service" and other legislation on military issues. The territorial principle, combined with the draft for the branches and arms of the troops that are assigned to the republics, could be taken as the foundation of those documents. We are requesting that the government of the Russian Federation publish a standard document, which would restore the destroyed system of initial military training for the youth at state institutions and establish it at private ones in the country. A delay with the issue of laws and decrees that regulate the life and activity of military structures, after all, introduces disarray in the mutual relations of civilian authorities and the army under

conditions of the development of military reform and the creation of the Russian Army.

CIS: POLICY

Call for Adoption of Russian Alternative Service Law

92UM1478B Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 5 Sep 92 p 5

[Article by A. Kalinin, deputy of the Moscow Soviet and chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Issues: "Alternative Civilian Service—An Essential Condition for Joining the European Legal Expanse"]

[Text] The Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, it looks like, is inclined to postpone again and again the consideration and adoption of a law on alternative civilian service, demonstrating a disrespect for the prevailing Constitution, Article 45 of which directly assumes the adoption of such a law. I remind you that alternative civilian service is labor service replacing active military service for those youth who, by reason of their ethical convictions, do not accept violence, any wars or the bearing and use of arms, and refuse to take the military oath or any actions that are connected with armed struggle.

Alternative service should be completed at state enterprises, institutions and organizations, should be socially useful and should not be in the nature of punishment. Considerations of conscience allowing a person to demand alternative service could be based on a religious or other world view, but do not include political convictions—that is, a reluctance to serve in namely this army, or this government or this state. The adoption of a law on alternative civilian service in essence facilitates the assurance of freedom of conscience and convictions for citizens and their rights to live and conduct themselves in accordance with the dictates of conscience, provided it causes no harm to other citizens.

The development of the corresponding legislation has effectively been monopolized by the Committee of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation on Defense and Security and is being accomplished in a spirit of departmental lawmaking—without widespread discussion or a regard for public opinion. The danger thus exists that after all the procrastination, a law will be adopted that is exceedingly imperfect and unsatisfactory, both from the point of view of the actual requirements of society and from the point of view of international standards in the realm of human rights.

We are hoping nonetheless that with your help, readers, we will be able to overcome indifference, parochial interests and bureaucratic and procedural hurdles. The fight for the fastest possible adoption of a satisfactory law on alternative civilian service is part of the fight for democracy in Russia and for the affirmation of the rights and freedoms of man in our country. By sending away to

the Moscow Bureau of the Transnational Radical Party [TRP] (103051, Moscow, 2nd Kolobovskiy Per., 11-7. Telephone/fax 299-88-21), you can obtain the text of the draft legislation on alternative civilian service that was developed with the participation of specialists and representatives of the public. By independently evaluating the draft legislation, you can either support it or express a negative attitude toward it. Appeal to your legislators at the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, insisting that they demand consideration of this draft legislation, along with the draft legislation of the Committee for Defense and Security, and give preference to the legislation that to the greatest extent ensures the rights and freedoms of the individual. Even if you consider our legislation in no way suitable and report that opinion to your people's deputy, you will be involved in the process of emergence of a real, working democracy, able to rectify the mistakes that have been made and improve the imperfect by the will of the citizens.

I would like to note two elements. First, we are ready to consider any of your proposals to improve draft legislation and take into account those of them that correspond to its spirit and aims. Second, our draft legislation is in no way a "party product": people of various political views and convictions, united by a desire to ensure for Russians freedom of conscience and conviction and able to find a mutually acceptable compromise on that basis, took part in the development of the draft legislation. The participation of members of the TRP in the development of the legislation naturally gives the party no right to make any claim to some exceptional role in the fight to recognize the right to reject military service for considerations of conscience.

The TRP, strictly speaking, is announcing the legislation not without a certain embarrassment, realizing that it has proved to be in the role of leader only because the Russian parties have not paid any attention to this problem. The party of human rights—the TRP—has always consistently defended freedom of conscience and convictions, and has actively facilitated the adoption of laws on alternative civilian service in other countries. It cannot remain indifferent to the state of affairs in this area in Russia, since Russia is part of Europe and should naturally enter the European legal expanse. The TRP is ready to collaborate with other political forces in the cause of creating a democratic and law-governed state and ensuring human rights. It is possible that for some of you, involvement in the campaign for the fastest possible adoption of the law on alternative civilian service will become the first step on the path of entering the ranks of the TRP, membership in which does not envisage the rejection of loyalty to national parties and organizations by virtue of its transparty nature.

In the name of the Federal Council of the TRP and the developers of the draft legislation on alternative civilian service.

Form to Join the TRP—1992

Name:
Address:
City:
Postal index/Zip code:
Country:
Telephone:
Year of birth:
Profession:
Languages you know:
Party memberships:
I am joining the Radical Party for 1992 and paying dues in the amount of 25 rubles
I am making a donation of:
for:
date:

By sending away to the Moscow Bureau of the Transnational Radical Party, you can obtain the text of the draft legislation on alternative civilian service.

Address: 103051, Moscow, 2nd Kolobovskiy Per., 11-7.

Tel./Fax: (095) 299-88-21

Preview of Military Legislation in Upcoming Supreme Soviet Session

*92UM1476 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
18 Sep 92 pp 1, 3*

[Article by Vladimir Urban of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: "It Is Finally Time for the Deputies to Take Up the 'Military Package' of Laws in Earnest"]

[Text]

A Forecast for the Impending Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation

An army is essential to a state. The state defines the laws according to which the army lives. The Russian Army has begun to be created on the basis of the former union army. But there is still no single law that would codify its status. The Law on Defense that was adopted recently by the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation has not been signed by the president of Russia, and has been returned to parliament for repeat consideration...

The report that the next session of the Supreme Soviet will open on September 22 has immediately elicited questions from our readers. The most fair reproach is the question, When will the deputies take up the "military package?" But really, when?

Only the following is known so far. The parliamentarians, of course, will return first of all to the laws (11 of them) that elicited comments from Boris Yeltsin. Judging by his explanatory note, several provisions in the Law on Defense do not suit the head of state. True, the Committee on Legislation and the Committee on

Defense Issues and Security have already consented to the fact that the president of the Russian Federation can name the minister of defense and his deputies without the consent of the armed forces, as the contemporary constitutional norms require. The request by the president to expand the list of troops involved "in defense using means of armed struggle," and to include on it the troops of Civil Defense, the Federal Agency for Governmental Communications and Information under the president of the Russian Federation, the Main Security Directorate etc. was not supported by the committees. They decided to limit themselves to including just the Civil Defense troops on that list. A "truce" on the legislative front has thus not been achieved. And it could spill over into a protracted conflict, from which there will be no gain whatsoever for us voters. But the losses are large, since the consideration of other issues from the "military package" could be delayed.

I would also remind you of the appeal of Boris Yeltsin to the parliament in connection with the grave situation that has taken shape in manpower acquisition for the armed forces in the area of conscript servicemen. The president has proposed conducting an experiment in 1992-93 by filling the positions of soldiers, sailors, non-commissioned and petty officers by contract. The appeal says that the Ministry of Defense estimates the need for another 7.8 billion rubles this year, and 21.6 billion next year, in order to conduct this experiment.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, at its first session after the summer holidays on September 7, discussed the presidential proposals and decided to submit them for the consideration of the session. And they had to do that first of all, since the fall call-up was fast approaching... The principle of contract service, by the way, is inherent in the draft law on military obligation and military service that was adopted on the first reading. But some government experts feel that the appeal of the president of the Russian Federation was connected directly with the fact that the deputies will not be able to adopt this law in the near future.

The chairman of the Subcommittee on the Armed Forces of the parliamentary Committee on Issues of Defense and Security, Aleksey Tsarev, with whom I spoke two days ago, on the contrary feels that the law will take effect as soon as January 1. There is, of course, a great deal of work. There were something on the order of 150 amendments after the first reading that will, the committee feels, improve the draft.

There were, as was assumed, many proposals for releases and deferrals from the draft. And everything favors the broadening of the corresponding articles. Matters sometimes reach overt pressure. Say an amendment came in from many of the committees of the Supreme Soviet and ministries to release from the draft the only son of a "single mother who is 50 years of age and who has been raising him for seven years without a husband." Recently, says Tsarev, they even called from the Moscow Patriarchy. It turns out, the deputy assumes, that the

amendment "goes" for a specific person. And such methods, it turns out, are in vogue today...

One thinks that parliament will be able to handle this pressure. It will be far harder to overcome their own inertia, and sometimes incompetence as well. That must also unfortunately be discussed. The already widely advertised draft law on the status of servicemen that was prepared by the Committee on the Affairs of Invalids and Veterans of War and Labor, the Social Protection of Servicemen and the Members of Their Families will scarcely be able to be considered at a session of the Supreme Soviet in the near future. It will be submitted for its first reading, by decision of the Presidium, only after its refinement in conjunction with the Committee on Issues of Defense and Security.

One of course cannot get by in the parliament without disputes and differences of opinion. Debate is even desirable, as long as a high-quality product—the law—is obtained as a result. Today even the "quality-control department," in the form of the joint sessions of the Supreme Soviet, is letting garbage through, and sometimes unfortunately even adding to it.

A brief (one paragraph) law was adopted at the last session, for example, on the discharge from active military service of individuals in the officer corps at their own request. By recommendation of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, it was assumed that this right would be enjoyed by individuals whose overall duration of service in officer positions was no less than five years. But the representative of the CIS OVS [Combined Armed Forces] insisted right during the course of the session on an addition—"upon the completion of a military educational institution." The deputies, in violation of procedure, adopted the amendment orally and voted it in. Now come the questions: what about those who have served five years as an officer, but completed a civilian higher educational institution before that? Now a new amendment has to be adopted, or the necessary norm has to be introduced into another law.

To all appearances we should also not expect a law this year on pension support for servicemen. There is in parliament, as far as I was able to ascertain, still "only the idea." The draft should be submitted by the president of the Russian Federation, but the list of paramount items for the coming session has no such document.

The overall conclusion that could be drawn is that the package of defense laws for the Russian Army will be a very light one as before. Which brings no honor to our Supreme Soviet and, of course, does not add to its reputation in the eyes of army society.

These are not just reproaches for the Subcommittee on the Armed Forces. Why is only the opinion of Deputy Tsarev being cited today? He is simply one of several individuals today—he is the chairman of the subcommittee, he is in the role of a "workhorse." Experts are helping, of course, but... Why is there no one who wants to go onto the committee on a permanent basis? It

provides no particular benefits, and it is not all that easy to create laws—the deputies have already had time to become convinced of that.

From three to seven deputies worked on every draft defense law at one time in the former all-union Supreme Soviet. And it took up to six months to create the bills. And now there is effectively one person for all the laws at once. This has not yet been observed in world legislative practice.

A legislative base on defense problems has already been created in almost all of the republics of the former Union. The deputies from the White House obviously need to hurry up.

Russia has tripped over military reform several times in its history. It could happen this time as well, if the "military package" of laws does not occupy a place befitting it at the session of the Russian parliament. We are awaiting September 22 nonetheless...

Military Budget Issues to Come Before Supreme Soviet

92UM1497A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Sep 92 p 2

[Interview with Doctor of Economic Sciences Professor Colonel Sergey Filippovich Vikulov, deputy chief of the Military-Finance Economic Department of the State Financial Academy, by Yuriy Gladkevich of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: "The Army Does Not Need Much Money—It Needs as Much as it Needs"]

[Text] A significant portion of the letters coming to the editors touch on problems of financing the armed forces of Russia.

Our correspondent met with military scholar and specialist in the realm of military economics and finance Doctor of Economic Sciences Professor Colonel S. Vikulov, deputy chief of the Military-Finance Economic Department of the State Financial Academy.

[Gladkevich] Sergey Filippovich, the Russian military budget will be discussed at the coming session of the parliament. Do you have any apprehensions that a desire to trim it even more will predominate in the course of the discussion, rather than a scientific approach?

[Vikulov] I understand what elicits your question. There really have been many calls in recent years to cut and cut the funds being sent for the needs of the army... I will not assert that they have had an extremely destructive effect on the approaches to the formation of the military budget. I have been engaged for many years in the development of documents of a program nature that have later been used in the formation of the military budget, and I know that a scientific approach to this problem has by and large been preserved at all times.

The political climate and conditions in the country and in the parliament have nonetheless had an effect, now

more, now less... I am convinced that that should not be the case. And I hope that a truly scientific approach to this issue will be displayed at the current legislative session. It is true, of course, that the structure of the military budget will undergo definite changes even in that case. Changes have already occurred—quite marked ones—in connection with the adoption of the defensive doctrine of the state and the proportionate share of spending on various areas of activity of the armed forces has changed, with spending down sharply for the production and procurement of arms and, on the other hand, up for socially oriented line items in the budget.

[Gladkevich] But the army is first and foremost a military force. And what kind of a force is it if the spending on arms is cut back so sharply?...

[Vikulov] Your observation makes sense. The interests of the state really do require that the army receive as much funding as it needs so as to have everything necessary, and moreover of the best quality. The state will naturally no longer tolerate any excesses, and it cannot afford them anyway (the way the arms race exhausted and undermined our economy is well known). But it is in no way suitable to leave the army without modern weapons, or with old ones. They understand this in the government, and the defense order to industry for 1993, as is well known, has already been increased.

The fact that the rate of decline in spending on scientific research and experimental design is far from as high as, say, on production is an encouraging one as well. That work, with an attentive attitude toward it, will help us to preserve and augment scientific, technical and technological potential in the realm of creating arms in these difficult times...

[Gladkevich] You will agree, however, Sergey Filippovich, that far from all members of parliament investigate the specific requirements of the armed forces in a professional manner...

[Vikulov] I do. And I would even add that the consideration of variants of documents on military issues at the Supreme Soviet is rarely practiced today. This could have a negative impact on the effectiveness of the legislation being adopted. But our legislators, after all, are actively bringing in specialists and military experts, and competence in their consideration is thus being ensured nonetheless. It is another matter whether the military specialists themselves should display a greater vested interest in collaborating with the legislative bodies.

[Gladkevich] A question for the leadership of the military-finance department in that regard. There are almost seventy candidates of sciences and six doctors of sciences at your higher educational institution—quite a force. Do you have your own scientific contribution to the documents that will be discussed at the session?

[Vikulov] We have unfortunately still not established direct contacts with the committees and commissions of

the Supreme Soviet, or with those governmental bodies that are occupied with problems of financing the armed forces. Although we are naturally having a mediated influence on the process of developing the documents, including the military budget.

The higher educational institution works under orders from the Chief Directorate for Budget and Finance of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, the General Staff and other military structures. The basic areas are the development of economic fundamentals for the defense and military budgets, economic support for the armed forces and substantiation of the structure of the economics of the army and navy in the transition to the market. We are working most intensively today on work connected with changing the whole system of economic relations in the transition to the market...

Our projects, then, are naturally reflected in the documents that are being submitted at the session of the Supreme Soviet. And we are planning to conduct broad-scale research on the economic optimization of military organizational development in particular, so that the economic and financial aspects of the regional disposition of forces and the structuring of the troops and arms systems are studied in a scientific manner in connection with the reformation of the Russian armed forces. One important problem is the creation of a contemporary system of unit administration and services and a financial mechanism in the army and navy. The topic of conversion is also an interesting one in the armed forces. There is plenty enough work for the near future. The main thing is that it be useful both for the legislators and for the bodies of executive power.

[Gladkevich] But wouldn't it be better to create some body—scientific, methodological—that would be occupied with military-economic and financial problems, and would prepare recommendations for the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and the country?

[Vikulov] That makes sense. We have proposed, by the way, the creation of a Center for Military-Economic Research in the Russian Ministry of Defense (that could even be done on the basis of our department). But you probably know how difficult things are going with the creation of new structures in the country today... I assume nonetheless that such a Center would certainly pay for itself, on both an applied-scientific and a material plane.

[Gladkevich] And a final question. I know that your department marked its forty-fifth anniversary the other day. Which was greater—a festive feeling or alarm for the future of the institution?

[Vikulov] There was both the one and the other. Our personnel, candidly speaking, after all, are a hot commodity in today's labor market. Magnificent specialists have simply become desired objects for various commercial structures. And, it must be said, entirely successfully. Russian business is not skimping in paying for the labor of economists, financial specialists or bankers, while the

pay of an officer, you understand, is a poor argument in the debate with tempting proposals from commercial structures. The institution is losing the best personnel, and I hope we are not left without instructors altogether in the near future...

Dynamic of Expense Patterns in the Military Budget

Line item	Share of expenses in percent of total		
	1990	1991	1992
Maintenance of armed forces	27.2	33.4	54.7
Payments for arms, military hardware, matériel	43.7	37.3	16.1
Payments for scientific and technical products	18.6	16.7	10.6

Nuclear Veterans' Group Leader Interviewed

92UM1504A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Sep 92 p 2

[Interview with Vladimir Yakovlevich Bentsianov, head of the Committee of Veterans of Special-Risk Subunits, by Lieutenant-Colonel Valentin Rudenko, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "It Was Not a Nuclear Mushroom Which Poisoned Our Souls"]

[Text] Today everyone is aware that not just scientists were involved in the creation of the homeland's nuclear shield, but also thousands of servicemen directly involved in assembling the warheads and testing the nuclear bombs. Three years ago they joined together to form the Committee of Veterans of Special-Risk Subunits, headed by Vladimir Bentsianov, who took part in the Totskiy exercise of 1954 and recently served as deputy general director of the Sevzapmebel association. Our correspondent interviewed him.

[Rudenko] Vladimir Yakovlevich, how did the idea of forming the committee come about, and who became members?

[Bentsianov] For many years there was no information in the press on exercises involving nuclear weapons. When some small mention slipped out, nothing was said about the fact that military personnel had taken part in them. It was as though the atomic bomb were an abstraction. But those who were involved in its development and testing were doing something great. These were heroic people.

Their heroism lies also in the fact that, having signed the oath not to reveal military secrets, they remained true to their word for several decades. This was unprecedented in the history of our army and foreign armies.

The restructuring raised the curtain of secrecy surrounding the testing of nuclear weapons. A number of articles on the Totskiy and other exercises appeared in the central newspapers, including KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. I myself appeared on one of the popular Leningrad television programs and shared my recollections of that hot September in '54. After that I began to receive literally bundles of letters, and each letter represented a tragedy and human suffering. And so we decided to unite into the Committee of Veterans of Special-Risk Subunits, which subsequently acquired the status of a state-public organization of the Russian Federation.

The committee membership includes those who have actually stood beneath a nuclear mushroom or flown through one, those directly involved in the testing of nuclear weapons. They include Capt 1st Rank (retired) Nikolay Zateyev, commander of one of the first nuclear-powered submarines, the K-19, Col (retired) Yuriy Sazonov, an assembler of nuclear warheads, including the one for the "Totskiy bomb," Lt Col (retired) Yevgeniy Ivanovich Novikov, who has done an enormous amount of work to locate flight personnel who participated in the exercises, and many other military nuclear specialists.

Officially our committee was formed in Leningrad, now St. Petersburg.

On 9 May 1990 we marched for the first time along the Neva, carrying our banner "Veterans of Special-Risk Subunits. They say that the editorial offices of local newspapers were flooded with letters following that, asking who we are.

[Rudenko] And just why does your committee have that name? To my knowledge, there never were any special-risk subunits in the army, the KGB or the MVD.

[Bentsianov] You are right, there never were. We called ourselves that for a reason, however. First of all, to underscore the great heroism and devotion to the homeland of these people. In the second place, in order somehow to downplay our involvement with nuclear weapons. We feel that there is no point in delving into this.

The military nuclear-weapons specialists are a special breed of people. The nuclear mushroom poisoned their lives but not their souls. Hundreds of letters received by the committee complain that these people have been forgotten. Not a single letter has criticized the government, the state or the army, however.

I want everyone to know that the committee is not a bunch of complainers or nuclear martyrs, but people who passed knowingly through the epicenter of a nuclear explosion.

[Rudenko] Do you have figures on how many nuclear-weapons specialists there are in our country? It is not

impossible, after all, that there were other exercises and tests about which nothing is yet known.

[Bentsianov] I do not have a precise figure, and I do not believe anyone does. Everything pertaining to nuclear weapons was done under great secrecy. We know of cases in which the names of military units and personnel were changed. We have still set for ourselves the super-task of finding each of them, however.

At the present time the committee includes participants in exercises and tests of nuclear weapons at the Semipalatinsk, Novaya Zemlya, Totskiy and other test ranges, as well as assemblers of nuclear warheads, specialists who have helped mop up following accidents on surface ships and submarines, and other military personnel who participated in the creation of the homeland's nuclear shield. Our membership includes not only infantrymen, signalmen, airmen, artillerymen, sailors and military doctors, but also employees of the former KGB and MVD.

[Rudenko] Vladimir Yakovlevich, when I read the charter of the Committee of Veterans of Special-Risk Subunits, I noticed that you have set for yourselves a very broad range of tasks. Which of them do you consider to have priority?

[Bentsianov] The committee's main job is unquestionably the emotional, medical, financial and social rehabilitation of the military nuclear-weapons workers and their families. Sadly, many of those who spent time beneath a nuclear mushroom are no longer with us.

Despite the collapse of the former Union, the committee feels an obligation to protect our military colleagues not just in Russia but also in the other Commonwealth states. We have not separated ourselves into Ukrainians, Uzbeks, Kazakhs or Moldovans. More than 20 nationalities were represented just in our intelligence battalion. We called one another compatriots. I am even now searching for Bayselbayev, Taytushanov and Dyusembayev from Kazakhstan, Papazyan from Armenia, Bordiyan from Moldova, Aman Nepesov, Nepes Durdy, little Nepes who played his native instrument, from Turkmenia, Batyrov from Kyrgyzia, Kryuchkov from Ivanovo, Ryurik Abashidze from the Georgian city of Zestafoni, Paliy and Parfenov from Ukraine and Karl Jarvolaht from Estonia. I pray to God that they are alive and well.

[Rudenko] By the time of the Totskiy exercise, in which you were a participant, we were already familiar with the Hiroshima and Nagasaki experience. Was it taken into account for the exercise?

[Bentsianov] It would be difficult to give an exhaustive answer to that question. I was a soldier, and I could not have known everything. It is a generally acknowledged fact, however, that the potential effects of a nuclear explosion were underestimated in the exercise. I believe this occurred because those directly responsible for conducting the exercise had a rigidly defined and absolute

specific mission: to provide a weapon with a certain force within a certain time at any cost.

Nonetheless, when the state acquired our signature on the agreement not to disclose state secrets—and this was perfectly correct at the time, during the cold war—it should have subjected all of the participants in the exercise to a medical examination and subsequent monitoring. Had this been done, we would perhaps have been better prepared for the Chernobyl tragedy. Unfortunately, despite all our efforts, we have still not undergone any special medical tests up to the present time.

We have complaints about both the former leadership of the Ministry of Defense and the scientists. One should not speak ill of the dead, but when Academician Sakharov expressed his humane thoughts about the elimination of nuclear weapons, he must have known that many servicemen were exposed to various degrees of radiation during the tests. He had an obligation to find and help us. We were close to him in the purpose of his work, in spirit and in science.

In the future, when the government sends servicemen into any kind of undertaking involving risk, it has an obligation to provide a risk fund, that is, funds to provide for the individual and his family for life, should he lose his health.

It would be proper to specify special benefits for these servicemen, because those who develop radiation sickness die internally. Today we feed junk peddlers [prokhindei] and profiteers black caviar instead of using these resources, albeit minimal, for the participants in nuclear testing and the mop-up operation following the Chernobyl tragedy. Every little gram of protein is a small bit of health for them.

Many of the participants in the testing acquired a whole array of diseases over a period of 20-30 years. Yuriy Dmitriyevich Sorokin has had 63 different diseases diagnosed, for example. I believe that it would be fair to call these diseases wounds or combat injuries.

[Rudenko] Is it actually realistically possible to link the current diseases of the military nuclear-weapons workers to their involvement in military nuclear activities? Decades have gone by, after all.

[Bentsianov] It is difficult but possible. There are special methods, and our specialists know them. They include studying the thyroid gland, assessing the condition of tooth enamel and a large number of other factors from which one can determine the effect of a nuclear explosion upon the human organism.

Unfortunately, we have neither the personnel nor the funds to perform this entire group of studies today. Some people are taking advantage of this fact to stall for time.

Our committee is recognized and legitimated by decrees of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Justice. What we had to go through to achieve this, though! We went through 450 offices of

various ministries and departments and obtained resolutions from the highest officials in the state.

Decree No. 2123-1, "On Social Protection for Citizens From the Special-Risk Subunits," passed by the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation on 27 December 1991 was published that month. Among other things, the decree states that the committee, and no one else, determines whether an individual was actually involved in the testing of or exercises involving the use of nuclear weapons. A medical-social expert commission is being set under the committee for this purpose, as well as a scientific treatment center. The latter is headed by Col Med Service (retired) Igor Nikolayevich Bukhalovskiy, doctor of medical sciences and professor, and recently deputy chief therapist for the armed forces. We are well aware of our responsibility to the state to see that the benefits are used precisely for the military nuclear-weapons workers and not for imposters. The latter will show up, no doubt.

We have already resolved many problems. Not all of them, however, unfortunately. For now the committee exists on crumbs and charitable contributions. We do not even have our own quarters. We are squeezed into a single room, where nine people work. Around 10,000 personal files are also kept there. And we have to certify almost 15,000 people rapidly. Bear in mind that people with the same sicknesses work on the committee.

It has now been eight months since the Supreme Soviet issued the decree, and we are at work every day preparing corresponding decisions for the government. The nuclear-weapons veterans believe that their contribution to the building of a nuclear shield for the homeland will be properly appreciated and that they will receive some sort of compensation for the loss of their health. We must not forget that the army is founded not just on the present and the future, but the past as well.

Address of the Committee of Special-Risk Subunits:
191011, St. Petersburg, post office box 68, telephone number 278-86-35.

Supreme Soviet Considers Military Legislation

92UM1513A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
25 Sep 92 p 1

[Article by Vladimir Yermolin: "At the Session of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet: Of the President's Three Amendments to the Law on Defense, One is Adopted, and Only in Part"]

[Text] In the afternoon of September 24, the parliament considered Russian President Boris Yeltsin's amendments to the Law on Defense. For all practical purposes, only one was adopted—to be more precise, a part of it: on including the Civil Defense Forces on the list of forces to be enlisted in "defense involving the use of means of armed combat." The persistent attempts by the RF President's representatives—Aleksandr Kotenkov and General of the Army Konstantin Kobets—to include on

that list a number of other agencies, including the government communications troops, failed to meet with understanding among the parliamentarians. A tendency to reduce the "military presence" in the system of government agencies prevailed. A earlier scare took its toll, a scare that one deputy expressed this way: "We cannot entrust communications to the military; otherwise, one fine day some colonel is going to 'cut off' the state."

In the opinion of General of the Army Kobets, in taking this decision the parliament is "removing all power from the defense system." Now problems will arise—significant problems—in dividing government communications troops into "military" and "civilian." One hopes that the reorganization will not affect the health of the holy of holies of state administration—government communications—and hence the strength of Russia's defensive shield.

The deputies also rejected the President's attempt as Supreme Commander in Chief to reserve solely unto himself one-man authority to manage personnel policy in the top army and navy echelons. They took the following decision: The Russian President appoints the defense minister, the deputy defense ministers, and the commanders in chief of the service branches with the consent of the Supreme Soviet. But since this is in conflict with the constitutional norm, they also resolved that this article will take effect only after appropriate amendments are made in the text of the RF Constitution.

Despite the President's position, the deputies also reserved unto themselves the power to set the number of generalships, no doubt seeing this issue as a key one in overseeing military reform. Meanwhile, it is obvious that the devising and confirmation of the Armed Forces structure will also inevitably determine the content of the established total complement of personnel. It is doubtful that the problem of generalships was of an isolated nature. Although, of course, deputies will reap certain populist dividends by participating in the solution of this problem.

Finally, the question of courts martial was considered. The following formulation was adopted: "The competence of courts martial extends to hearing only cases involving military crimes, with the exception of the instances specified in the Law On Courts Martial." I would only point out that the aforementioned law has yet to be adopted. This could create certain difficulties in the work of courts martial, as presidential representative Aleksandr Kotenkov pointed out.

A characteristic feature of the discussion of the president's amendments to the Law On Defense was the unanimity, with some minor exceptions, of the parliamentary factions. The Supreme Soviet seemed to be serving notice that it intends to not only maintain

comprehensive oversight over the Armed Forces and military development in the country, but also to develop and deepen that oversight.

The President's amendments to the Law on Internal Troops were discussed on the same day.

CIS: GROUND TROOPS

Performance, Specifications of BTM-4 Entrenching Machine

92UM1459A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
15 Sep 92 p 2

[Article by Colonel Vitaliy Moroz, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "The BTM-4 Comes Out on the Assembly Line"]

[Text] Just yesterday they were saying: full engineer preparation of a divisional defense area required the removal of the same amount of dirt as for an average-size hydroelectric power plant. Other comparisons are required today because even a squad defensive position is no longer seen simply as 100 meters of trenches with main and alternate firing positions and a minimum of protective structures, but as a more or less branched network of fighting and communication trenches giving a handful of soldiers a real opportunity to maneuver and making it difficult for the enemy to detect them prior to an attack. Troops in a defense have an enormous amount of ground work to do, and it cannot be accomplished without highly productive excavating equipment, particularly trenching equipment.

Our Engineer Troops have such equipment. Many who have served and are serving in the Army have had the opportunity to see the BTM-3 high-speed entrenching machine, equipped with a bucket wheel, in action. Mounted on an AT-T heavy artillery prime mover base, it can still compete with the best foreign entrenching machines. The TMK-2 entrenching machine with high-strength teeth on tubing instead of buckets also digs trenches at a fast pace. The PZM-2 general-purpose regimental earth-moving machine is also quite suited for digging fighting and communication trenches. But today our story is about the BTM-4, a new high-speed entrenching machine which not everyone is familiar with yet, even in the Engineer Troops. It has withstood harsh testing in the north and south, in the central zone, in soils of various densities, and in winter and summer conditions, but series-production of it has yet to be set up at Russian plants.

The base for this new high-speed entrenching machine is the MT-T heavy tracked combination prime mover-carrier. This provides the machine a high off-road capability and a fairly decent march speed.

The BTM-4 surpasses previous domestic entrenching machines considerably in technical productivity, and there is nothing like it abroad. In addition to the basic

excavating part—the bucketless wheel—the BTM-4 also has a bulldozer attachment needed for auxiliary work.

Basic Specifications of the BTM-4

Engine horsepower	710
Weight, tonnes	41
Crew size	2
Top speed, km/hr	60
Range on one fueling, km	500 and 3 hrs work
Technical productivity when digging, meters/hr:	
a trench 1.1 meters deep in unfrozen ground, category II and III	1,200
a trench 1.1 meters deep in frozen ground	400
a trench 1.5 meters deep in unfrozen ground, category II and III	1,000
a trench 1.5 meters deep in frozen ground	300

A significant, fundamental advantage of the BTM-4 over the BTM-3 and all other entrenching machines of earlier designs is the high productivity when digging in frozen ground, which could not be achieved before. On the TMK-2 and PZM-2, for example, even use a special winch and anchor device to create additional traction when digging trenches in frozen ground. Nevertheless, the BTM-4 can do in five minutes what it takes the regimental earth-moving machine one hour to do.

Quite a few pieces of dual-purpose equipment are being developed in the Engineer Troops, that is, equipment that can also be used successfully in the national economy. The high-speed entrenching machine is undoubtedly such a piece of equipment.

The upper picture [not reproduced] shows the machine on a loading platform with the digging wheel in the transporting position. The lower picture [not reproduced] shows it at work digging a trench in frozen ground. One can see how finished and neat the trench, with a nearly ready front parapet and rear parapet parados. The infantry has only to thank those who thought up this machine and put it into metal.

Description, Specifications of Ka-50 'Hokum' Helicopter

92UM1495A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
22 Sep 92 p 2

[Article by Sergey Prokopenko, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: "The Ka-50: A Coaxial, Single-Seater Unlike the Others"]

[Text] The appearance of this helicopter at the recent Farnborough International Air Show caused a sensation. In the opinion of experts, the Ka-50 combat helicopter (named the "Hokum" in NATO), created at the VNTK

imeni N.I. Kamov, is superior to all combat helicopters in the world in its class for specifications and performance characteristics, including the well-known American AH-64 Apache.

"The helicopter was developed on a competitive basis with the Moscow Helicopter Plant imeni M.L. Mil," says Sergey Mikheyev, general designer at the VNTK imeni N.I. Kamov. "The creative rivalry with colleagues imposed a high responsibility and helped to create a reliable machine. And we took our own path, characteristic only of us..."

The Ka-50 made its first flight on 27 July 1982. The machine is made in the coaxial configuration traditional only for Kamov helicopters, that is, it has two counterrotating main rotors on one axis. It is unique in this sense.

Another peculiarity of the Ka-50 is that it is the first domestic ground-attack helicopter gunship that is controlled by one pilot. Its mission is operations over the battlefield, direct and indirect support of Ground Forces subunits. The onboard equipment and automatic equipment installed on the helicopter make it possible to effectively combine piloting with simultaneous target search, aiming and guidance of onboard weapons, and destruction of the targets. All current flight and system status information is displayed on the operator consoles and the display system. There are also modes for operating with information received over the radio channel from reconnaissance helicopters.

The Ka-50 is able to maneuver with a sudden course change of 180 degrees, turn the cockpit in flight, and execute sharp lateral movements at a speed of over 100 km/hr.

The equipment installed on it makes it possible to perform terrain-following flights and ensure altitude stabilization. The helicopter also has a target memory.

The armament, and above all the use of the 2A42 30-mm tank gun with selective feed, had a marked effect on forming the helicopter's design appearance. A very high firing accuracy is ensured thanks to the original mounting of the gun turret on the load-carrying part of the fuselage near the helicopter's center of gravity. Other types of armament—and they are diverse—are carried on the outer wing panels. The helicopter has a total of four weapon suspension points.

Basic Specifications and Performance Characteristics

Maximum flight speed (in a flat dive), km/hr	350
Maximum G-load	3
Static ceiling (out of ground effect), m	4000
Vertical rate of climb at 2500 meters, m/s	10
Main rotor diameter, m	14.5

Basic Specifications and Performance Characteristics (Continued)

Length of helicopter with rotors turning, m	16
Armament:	
ATGM	
—launch range, km	8-10
—armor penetration	900 mm with dynamic protection
—guidance system	laser
Cannon	
—caliber, mm	30
—feed	selective
—number of rounds	up to 500
Aircraft Rockets	
—caliber, mm	80
—number in units	up to 40

Use of other types of removable armament is possible.

The increased protection for the pilot is an indisputable merit. The cockpit is covered with armor that can withstand a direct hit by a 20-mm American round. A pilot ejection system is used for the first time.

The Ka-50 represents a new generation of combat helicopters capable of expanding considerably the combat capabilities of army aviation.

CIS: NAVAL FORCES

Adm Flt Kapitanets: Ship Survivability

92UM1492B Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK
in Russian No 8-9, Aug-Sep 92 (signed to press
28 Aug 92) pp 40-44

[Article by Admiral of the Fleet I. Kapitanets under rubric "Deployments and Flights": "Once More About Survivability"]

[Text] Survivability of ships largely is determined by their design features. Water was the principal enemy of seamen at the dawn of seafaring. Fire began to represent a growing danger for vessels with the appearance of "Greek fire" and then also of powder. Its damaging effect became dominant in the era of the sailing fleet. A report by Admiral G. A. Spiridov concerning the victory at Cesme is characteristic in this regard; in it he wrote: "The enemy military fleet . . . was attacked, smashed, broken up, burned, sent skyward, sunk, and turned into ash..." And in the last major battle of the sailing fleet at Sinop in 1853 a squadron commanded by P. S. Nakhimov burned and blew up a Turkish squadron. There were many such examples. But with the appearance of steel-hulled ships the principal factor leading to their loss again became water which came inside the hull. It was then that questions of watertight integrity advanced to the foreground. Academician A. N. Krylov

introduced "mathematical clarity" here. Tables proposed by S. O. Makarov and which Krylov improved were adopted in all world navies in one form or another.

True, there were also fires, but although they did substantial damage and led to a loss of combat effectiveness, fires as such (without an explosion of ammunition) strictly speaking were not the cause for loss of ships, especially large surface ships. Only in the World War II period did fires and explosions begin to come to first place as damaging factors for aircraft carriers. But the situation began to change after the war, and today it can be said with definiteness that fires and explosions have become the principal reasons which can lead with rather high probability to loss of the main types of ships even from a single antiship missile hit. Thus during the Falklands conflict this was the reason for the loss of six British ships and for serious damages to eighteen. The fact that modern ships were literally "crammed" with combustible materials contributed to large fires.

Thus fires and explosions again became primary damaging factors both in battle as well as in day-to-day ship operation. According to statistics, at the present time every fifth accident is a fire. This is also typical of maritime fleet vessels. According to some sources, of the overall number of ships that perish, in some years the world community loses around a fourth from fires or explosions. Over the last five and a half years 18 of the 50 emergency incidents aboard naval ships involved fires. In the most serious cases they led to loss of the ship (nuclear powered submarine Komsomolets) or to the impossibility of her further operation (large ASW ship Admiral Zakharov).

The objective pattern of the growth of ship offensive capabilities such as speed, quantity and quality of ammunition, and submergence depth of submarines changes the conditions in which survivability must be ensured and makes requirements for its assurance more rigid. This is also dictated by the fact that the electrical energy capacities of power plants and pressure in various systems have increased. At the same time specific indicators which to one degree or another characterize conditions under which personnel are operating, including performance of measures aimed at ensuring ship survivability, also are changing upward. For example, in recent decades the number of sea openings per person has increased 1.2 times. The proportion of displacement per person tripled. There was a 20 percent increase in the ratio of volume occupied by equipment to compartment volume, which increased the cramped nature of ship spaces. There was an increase of 1.5 times in electrical power system capacity per person. In other words, levels of possible damaging factors became higher.

An attempt to decrease weight, increase the comfort of lengthy deployments, and lower the energy transfer from operating machinery into the environment led to application of various materials (plastics, industrial rubber articles, open-cell foam polyurethanes and so on). There

is almost 50 percent of them on modern ships in relation to the overall amount of nonmetallic, nonstructural materials. It must be noted that nonmetallic materials are categorized, not always justifiably, as nonflammable and not dangerously explosive. In addition, with excess oxygen content (above 23 percent) a number of noncombustible materials become combustible and the combustion rate increases for combustibles. The conflagration area increases here, which in the final account determines temperature in the stricken space. At the same time, the dynamics of the course of the emergency and its transient nature also change depending on the type of compartment and its saturation with combustible materials. For example, for a compartment in which there are fluids containing hydrocarbons, the mean volume temperature of 850°C is reached in just 2-3 minutes. For compartments with a solid fuel load 450°C is reached in 7-8 minutes. Such high temperatures and the rapidity of the situation's development demand an appropriate level of resistance of various systems and materials. In what way can this be achieved?

It appears to us that the reserve here lies in increasing the resistance to temperature loads for the following elements: air systems under pressure (since their loss of seal leads to an aggravation of the compartment situation); and bulkheads, whose loss of seal spreads the emergency to other spaces which are not stricken. It also lies in strengthening the pressure hull and reducing its saturation above all with cable lead-ins, shock-absorbing sleeves and so on, since loss of seal leads to entry of water within the pressure hull and its spread throughout the ship.

It also must be noted that a temperature increase accompanied by a simultaneous pressure increase demands corresponding fast response from active fire protection systems (until their elements lose working capacity or there is a drop in efficiency of the system as a whole, as happened with the nuclear powered submarine *Komsomolets*). Thus, according to a ship's log entry, the following breakdowns occurred in the first 30 minutes of development of the emergency situation aboard the submarine: rudder control, communications among compartments, and the possibility of remote control of general systems of aft compartments were disrupted; the main power plant ceased operation; a fire developed in 6th compartment and ignitions arose in 5th, 4th and 3rd compartments; and CO content exceeded the permissible norm in all spaces except 1st compartment.

In analyzing the appearance of these failures one can say that swiftly developing events leave little time for comprehending the situation, making a decision and carrying it out. Can something be recommended here? I believe so, since an effective decision can be made and implemented if the possible development of a situation has been predicted in advance and measures which can be recommended for a specific instance have been determined and worked out.

Inasmuch as an analysis of major accidents confirms that the comprehensive effect of a fire's dangerous damage-producing elements can in the final account lead to a significant decrease in metacentric stability and reserve buoyancy, it is advisable to have previously compiled "prediction cards" of the possible development of a situation in this case as well. They must be compiled with definite consideration of the probable time of onset of particular events (secondary damages) and their consequences for the ship, and also the time inputs necessary for preventing such a development of events (sealing bulkheads, de-energizing electrical equipment of the stricken space, and so on).

It seems to us that it is advisable to develop these prediction cards with consideration of the following premises:

- survivability as a property is manifested when factors contributing to damage of equipment and injury of personnel arise and begin to develop for particular reasons (combat or operational);
- inasmuch as the appearance and especially the development (rate of spread, intensity) of damage-producing factors depends on compartment saturation with combustible components, amount of oxygen (both in compartment air as well as in a bound state), and presence of electrical equipment, then they definitely must be taken into account in working out the cards;
- possibility of appearance of a situation when development of one damage-producing factor exceeding design values can cause the appearance of a second one (for example, temperature in a compartment leads to loss of seal of high-pressure systems) and a third one (loss of seal of stuffing boxes leads to entry of outside water), which will bring about the appearance of more serious consequences than from a single effect;
- it must be remembered that for one reason or another the crew will not always be able to perform all recommended measures provided for in the "man-machine" system, and the prediction of further development of the situation must take this into account;
- a version always exists when a certain number of personnel will not be able to proceed to their battle stations at damage-control quarters (which is covered by articles 325 and 326 of the "Korabelnyy ustav VMF" [Navy Shipboard Regulations]), in connection with which priority damage-control measures will have to be performed in spaces which remain cut off only by the watchstanders of these spaces who are there in readiness condition No 2;
- in the phase of eliminating consequences of development of the emergency situation (righting a damaged ship, restoring her buoyancy and metacentric stability, normalizing the atmosphere in compartments, drying them, and so on), the crew is operating under conditions substantially differing from those of an undamaged ship (no remote control of system fittings, absence of hydraulic system pressure and so on).

Since the effectiveness of personnel damage control actions depends directly on that damage control equipment contained in the design as well as on ratios of passive and active protection systems, special attention must be given to questions of designing them. It appears that while still at the drawing boards designers are obligated to check and determine those key points which may become determining for an unfavorable development of events based on an analysis of possible versions of development of an emergency situation, which also means suggesting necessary technical solutions. It would appear that measures which must become primary here are those aimed at the following:

- maximum possible shortening of the "detection-decisionmaking-execution" cycle (a warning display, automatic delivery of fire extinguisher);
- automatic prevention of entry of air from the ship reserve to the center of conflagration;
- prevention "transportation" of the emergency throughout the ship (increased resistance of lines of communication passing through the bulkhead);
- precluding the possibility of a loss of reserve buoyancy and of entry of water into the compartment (increased resistance of outside lead-ins in the hull; placing kingston valves on the end main ballast tanks; precluding the possibility of spontaneous activation of main ballast vent valves).

Some recommendations have been implemented as of today. Kingston valves already have been installed in a number of designs. The procedure for adopting other requirements is specified by design plans and specifications for ships being built or overhauled (for example, installation of anticipatory signaling). Implementation of other recommendations involves research and development work to create technical equipment (automatically operating high pressure air valves, emergency communications).

Among organizational-technical measures to be noted is the documentation which has been developed aimed at improving efficiency of the personnel's use of technical equipment already existing aboard ship for damage control. It should be recalled here that in preceding decades the ship designer essentially was removed from creation of documentation for the crew's use of that technical equipment. This work was done during that period of a ship's creation when possibilities for its upgrading, an increase or decrease of personnel, and reconfiguration of posts and communication lines essentially were limited (installation work already had been completed). With consideration of that state of affairs, the new state standard "Ship Operating Documents" assigned elaboration of the "Instruction for the Damage-Control Compartment Watchstander" and "Recommendation for the Control Center" to design organizations—authors of the ship designs. With respect to industry, rehearsal of prototypes of these documents directly aboard those ships for which they are intended already has been completed. It is planned to begin placing them into effect for the first group of ships as of 1993. At the

same time an understanding essentially has been reached on the procedure and time periods for designers to work out the "Instruction on Use of Weapons and Technical Equipment in Nonspecification Regimes."

Work done in the last two years by specialists of Navy central directorates permitted determining a set of measures and creating a permanently acting system for preventing damage to ships, weapons and equipment. They include the following measures:

- identification of potentially dangerous places aboard ships (based on operating experience, expert assessments of survivability, and certification of living and official spaces);
- development and adoption of organizational measures to reduce the negative effect of particular design features, improve ship organization and placement of personnel, adjust bills and billet slips and so on;
- development by formation staffs of variants of actions which must be rehearsed by crews in controlling serious damages with the combined effect of damage-producing elements;
- development of recommendations on various ship damages by central design bureau designers and their formalization as a set of task-allocation documents for the control center, power plant and damage control station, command and staff department control stations, and damage control parties.

These measures were adopted with understanding in the fleets, where a large volume of work of useful content has been done. Experience gained here permitted revising and concretizing a number of requirements for ensuring survivability in the Manual for Ensuring Survivability of Ships and the Rules for Preparing Ships for Ensuring Survivability, which are planned for publication. They will increase and concretize requirements with respect to preventing emergency incidents and will substantially revise programs for damage control training of all categories of personnel. On completion of this work it appears advisable to make these documents the property of planning organizations. This will help ensure a mutual tie-in of materials being developed there and in the Navy, preclude possible alternative versions in assessing emergency situations, and develop identical recommendations for use of technical equipment.

Success of conducting damage control largely depends on a proper assessment of the situation and rapid implementation of the decision made. A ship rarely perishes as a result of primary damages. This occurs more often as a result of the spread of fire and water and vast breakdown of technical equipment. Therefore it seems to us that by using the most up-to-date solutions the capabilities contained in a ship design subsequently can be increased by upgrading control and making maximum effective use of limited ship assets. This in turn is determined by correctness and timeliness of information about damages, based on which it will be possible to develop an optimum

strategy of actions leading to rapid elimination of damages with few assets. Therefore another important direction for increasing the effectiveness of using technical equipment appears to be a complex of work to automate the damage control management process and develop a ship damage control system.

This process presently is being automated in three stages for ships in operation. In the first stage systems operating on the basis of personal computers but with manual input of ship condition data are being introduced on ships already built. They will help develop recommendations and plans of action for fighting water and fires, document damage control processes and present graphic and textual reference data on decks, longitudinal sections and cross-sections, trim and metacentric stability, and so on. This stage is being realized for surface ships with diesel, gas-turbine, boiler-turbine and nuclear power plants and on nuclear powered submarines.

The second stage proposes mating ship damage control systems with data sources in compartments and will provide automatic detection of an emergency and development of recommendations for the personnel's initial actions. Subsequently the arrival of manual and automatic correction of data on the status of the ship and her technical equipment is planned. Recommendations will be developed depending on previously given variants of ship emergencies and combat damages. A similar principle of automation is being realized as part of the central coordinating control system for large surface combatants and submarines being designed. Its information support and work algorithm reflect collective experience and knowledge accumulated both in the process of developing ship designs as well as during their operation. In our opinion, introducing such systems on ships will allow a substantial reduction in the probability of erroneous actions by the damage-control director.

In the third stage of the ship damage control system's development, to solve the full set of problems difficult to formalize it is planned to use principles of "expert systems" based on a personal computer network supporting development of recommendations both for damage control as well as for eliminating the consequences of emergencies in order to restore ship combat effectiveness.

Here it is necessary to note that it is advisable to develop a ship damage control system both for ships being designed as well as those subject to modernization; it seems to us that such a system should include the following:

- technical design systems for ensuring watertight integrity and explosion and fire safety;
- data sources on the entry of water and appearance of fire or weapon and equipment emergency;
- automatic development of recommendations for personnel actions;
- systems for damage control (control center, power

plant and damage control station, command department control stations and compartment control stations) and for evaluating the status of ship, weapons and equipment;

- actuating systems for eliminating emergencies (area and local);
- personnel protection and survival equipment.

Considering the increased fire risk of modern ships, ship damage control systems must be developed jointly by designer and client for each class of ship. This ship damage control system must be the basis of the modern concept of survivability.

As a result one can arrive at the following conclusions:

1. The foundations of design assurance of survivability are laid down in the stage of design and construction and are inseparably linked with operational-tactical assignments being adopted for achieving corresponding characteristics. The designing of ships and design support of survivability are a unified process. At the present time it is necessary to continue studies to combine basic specifications and performance characteristics and design survivability of ships, and to continue the substantiation and development of a ship damage control system.
2. The modern concept of survivability also must provide for adoption of those technical solutions which, with an emergency in any of the compartments (regardless of nature and development), do not lead to aggravation and spread of the emergency; do not cause a loss of capability to remain afloat; and prevent explosion of ammunition, entry of water inside the hull, loss of way, interruption of communications with compartments, loss of current information about development of the situation aboard ship, as well as loss of personnel in compartments not stricken.
3. It is necessary to develop models for predicting the development of emergency situations aboard ships in order to assess design assurance of survivability, to develop and make decisions, and to automate damage control management.
4. In the immediate future it is necessary to step up work in the interests of survivability of weapon and electronic equipment complexes, and to step up the conduct of studies of the mutual influence of possible emergency situations within compartments and ammunition accidents in order to prevent catastrophic consequences.
5. Lessons for increasing the level of personnel protection under extreme conditions must be learned as quickly as possible from the experience of combat operations of foreign fleets as well as from the development of emergency situations at sea. This must be done considering requirements of the international Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, to which our country became a party.

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R-Adm Belyshev Examines Problems of Shipbuilding, Repair

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[Interview with Rear Admiral L. Belyshev by Captain 1st Rank B. Tyurin, occasion, date and place not specified: "Shipbuilding and Repair: Weight of Problems on Budget Scales"; photograph of Belyshev included]

[Text] *In continuing the discussion begun in the article "Will Russia Remain a Sea Power,"¹ the editors requested its author, Rear Admiral L. Belyshev, to answer questions most often asked by our readers.*

[Tyurin] On 21 June 1992, referring to a foreign source, Russian television disseminated information about a possible major reduction (by approximately one-sixth) in the present CIS Navy ship order of battle, and also about certain countries' great interest in purchasing our ships being inactivated. What can you say on this score?

[Belyshev] It is obvious that people abroad are well informed that our Armed Forces, including the Navy, now are in a stage of sharp reduction. Speaking of the Navy, it should be emphasized that this is a unified military body. As you know, its makeup includes ships, aircraft and shore troops. Here I am not touching on the other side of the large naval infrastructure (support, repair, and supply personnel and equipment and so on; replacements and manpower acquisition). Call-up into the Armed Forces, including the Navy, has dropped sharply as of the present time. Naval ships and units are not up to strength in personnel. After former USSR republics within the CIS became sovereign, the Navy's status has been preserved as national for now, since territorially the Navy has its own structures in Russia, Ukraine, the Baltic, the Caucasus and even the Central Asian republics.

I believe the negative points which have shown up at the present time and which reduce its combat effectiveness (in other words, which do not permit it to exist under normal conditions) are familiar to everyone. They are the attempts (still continuing in Ukraine, Georgia, the Baltic and Azerbaijan) to privatize naval materiel—those same ships, weapons, equipment, property, and training institutions and centers; disruption of call-ups to active military duty and refusal to fulfill obligations to support the Navy's large strategic formations with provisions, fuel and other necessary supplies; absence of a contribution to the budget for defense on the part of all independent states of the CIS (except for Russia, which declared itself the successor to the USSR); disruption of shipbuilding programs and plans for repairs due to the absence of the necessary amount of financing and a break of previous economic ties, and so on. As you see, there are many problems, but we will dwell only on problems of military shipbuilding, a structure which in our time cannot survive without state support, above all support of Russia.

Until now the submarines, surface combatants, combatant craft, and logistic support vessels which were being built at shipyards were being paid for by the Navy from those funds which the country's government allocated both for the current year as well as for the future under approved military shipbuilding programs. In 1992 there was a sharp reduction in appropriations for construction and upkeep of ships and naval weapons. In addition, over the next 2-3 years it is proposed to completely stop military shipbuilding and convert production in some Russian enterprises, and to substantially reduce the volume of defense products in others. Under such conditions the allocated funds are forced to be concentrated on financing the completion of ships with a high degree of technical readiness. In addition to this, the Russian Federation government determined the product list of submarines, surface combatants and support vessels whose construction, refitting, modernization or repair is subject to termination as unsupported by financing. At the present time proposals are being developed for rational use of production work already performed and of the materials and equipment of these ships. True, the fate of 29 ships and vessels from among naval orders under construction at Ukrainian yards still is not clear.

The sharp reduction in construction and support to operation of naval forces naturally is having a negative effect on today's combat effectiveness of the Navy and, most important, on tomorrow's. Hundreds of scientific and production organizations and enterprises of shipbuilding and other sectors of the defense industry remain underutilized both under military and conversion plans, losing Russia's military shipbuilding scientific-production potential created over decades. Therefore we deem it advisable to finish construction of a number of incomplete ships in an export version and thereby support the work of enterprises and compensate for expenses they have incurred.

[Tyurin] Thus the goal of the Navy's proposals is to preserve military shipbuilding and create "mild" conversion conditions for defense enterprises by export deliveries of ships and combat equipment abroad?

[Belyshev] There is no question that such a goal is pursued not just for enterprises. If Ukraine will not meet us halfway, RUSSIA WILL HAVE TO INDEPENDENTLY resolve questions of preserving the Navy and military shipbuilding.

[Tyurin] But what ships will we realistically be able to continue building in the next few years, and in your assessment to what extent will our Navy's order of battle be reduced by the year 2000?

[Belyshev] It can be predicted with all obviousness that along with a sharp reduction in naval order of battle, there will be fewer large surface combatants and submarines included in near ocean zone forces. Evidently for now we will have to build a limited number of submarines, small second and third rank ships, and combatant

craft, developing the construction of similar export orders in parallel. Our domestic postwar shipbuilding has great experience in creating a wide product list of submarines, surface combatants, combatant craft, and vessels as well as service craft for essentially any combat or other purposes. By international acknowledgement, our combatant ships are distinguished *for the better* from foreign ones by highest saturation with weapons and technical equipment, better seaworthiness, and redundant reliability of weapons and technical equipment. And it is no secret that preference in naval equipment and arms markets often was given specifically to products of our military-industrial complex, including military shipbuilding. Our diesel submarines, medium and small surface combatants as well as various combatant craft received a good response abroad. Of course, we realize that if emphasis is placed on building ships above all for export, reducing our Navy's replenishment only to some small ships, we are depriving our own Navy of the ships of tomorrow. But we hope that this forced and temporary measure will permit preserving our shipbuilding until better times and that the work on export orders will allow us not to lose the scientific-production base. This is not our invention: certain foreign states adhered to similar tactics in what were difficult years for them. For example, construction of oceangoing submarines for the needs of its own Navy began relatively recently in postwar Germany, but German designers and industrialists arrived at this through export orders. In the present situation what is important is to "check" the blow and not permit the country's defense sector to disintegrate once and for all. The fact is, history constantly reminds us that in all stages of states' existence, their own security was guaranteed not only by the leadership's political steps, but chiefly by the presence of powerful, modern armed forces, including a navy!

[Tyurin] Tell me if only briefly what the present military shipbuilding represents and what main enterprises and organizations are included in it.

[Belyshev] Traditionally the country's entire scientific-production potential is used in creating such technically sophisticated and costly weaponry as submarines, surface combatants, combatant craft and vessels, for there is an old truth that one can judge a state's economy from the level of shipbuilding. Many hundreds of production enterprises; scientific research institutes and design bureaus of industry, Academy of Sciences organizations, test ranges and bases, as well as Navy ordering directorates take part in the design, construction and trials of ships and their complexes of weapons and technical equipment... Shipyards, which as a rule specialize either in submarine or surface shipbuilding, directly perform the construction of ships, installation of set-making equipment, and ship checkout and trials.

The bulk of such enterprises and organizations are located on the territory of Russia, and approximately 30 percent of former Union military shipbuilding is located in Ukraine, Moldova, the Baltic and a number of other republics that are members of the CIS. Russian military

shipbuilding has shipbuilding enterprises not only on the seacoast and ocean shore in the European part or in the Far East, but also in central regions of Russia. The cities of Severodvinsk (Northern Machine Building Enterprise PO [Production Association] is located there in particular), St. Petersburg (Admiralty Association), Nizhny Novgorod (formerly Gorkiy, Krasnoye Sormovo PO) and Komsomolsk-on-Amur (Shipyard imeni Leninist Komsomol PO) are among the largest centers of Russia's submarine construction. Leading design organizations in the sphere of submarine designing (for example, the St. Petersburg Rubin SKTB [special design-technological bureau] of the Ministry of Transport) or their affiliates also are in these same centers.

A leading role in Russia's military surface shipbuilding is played by St. Petersburg yards which build surface combatants: Baltic Shipyard (Kirov-Class nuclear powered guided missile cruisers), Northern Yard PO (Sovremennyy-Class destroyers), Sredne-Nevskiy Shipyard (mine countermeasures ships), Almaz SO [Sudostroitelnoye ob'yedineniye/Shipbuilding Association] (Zubr-Class and Dzheryan-Class surface effect landing ships) and a large number of specialized planning and design bureaus (PKB): the Northern PKB designs large missile-gun and ASW surface ships of the "nuclear powered guided missile cruiser," "guided missile cruiser," "large ASW ship" and "destroyer" types both with conventional steam power or gas-turbine engineering as well as nuclear power engineering; the Western PKB works in the area of creating mine countermeasures ships, floating docks, submarine rescue vessels, diving and fire vessels and so on; the Almaz TsKMB [Central Maritime Design Bureau] specializes in designing small guided missile ships and guided missile patrol boats, ASW and fire-support craft, and surface effect landing ships.

Until recently a large volume of naval orders in surface shipbuilding also were being fulfilled by a number of other Russian shipbuilding enterprises such as the Baltic Shipyard PO (city of Kaliningrad), which built Udaloy-Class large ASW ships, Vypel SPO [not further expanded] (city of Rybinsk; Zarnitsa-Class small guided missile ships), Zelenodolsk Shipyard imeni A. M. Gorkiy (city of Zelenodolsk; patrol ships and Albatros-Class small ASW ships and so on), as well as certain shipyards of Nizhny Novgorod, Khabarovsk and Petrozavodsk and of course all other enterprises of our defense sector connected with these building yards by intersector cooperation both in Russia as well as in other republics of the former USSR.

In Ukraine, the CIS member republic second in significance in the military shipbuilding area, the military shipbuilding structure is somewhat different, basically surface ships. Located here are such major enterprises as the Black Sea Shipyard PO (city of Nikolayev; until recently the main product was Kiev-Class and Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Kuznetsov-Class air-capable cruisers and the nuclear powered heavy air-capable cruiser Ulyanovsk, as well as a number of various auxiliary vessels), Shipyard imeni 61 Communards PO

(city of Nikolayev; until 1992 it built and repaired Slava-Class guided missile cruisers, Nikolayev-Class and Komsomolets Ukrainy-Class large ASW ships, submarine rescue vessels and vessels of other designs), and Zarya PO (city of Nikolayev; development and construction of naval ship gas-turbine plants). Patrol ships and a number of other surface combatants are built in Kerch, and support vessels in Kherson... A considerable number of incomplete ships whose fate must be decided on an urgent basis (since this is in the interests both of the Fleet and of the shipbuilding industry of both republics) remain both at Russian as well as Ukrainian yards. The fate of a large number of ships undergoing repair or which arrived to be put up for repair, especially in Ukraine, is unclear.

[Tyurin] It turns out that we can preserve our shipbuilding level largely by a combination of state financing and funds received from the sale of ships abroad?

[Belyshev] Until recently our defense enterprises in the shipbuilding sector were filling export orders that were considerable by our standards and not to the detriment of Navy interests. As a rule, Warsaw Pact countries, our neighbors Finland, China and North Korea, as well as a number of third world countries—India, Libya, Iraq, Syria—and many others from among young developing states previously were the primary exporters [sic]. Previously submarines, surface combatants and combatant craft of various types were delivered to them on the basis of mutual agreements. At that time fleets of Warsaw Pact member states, i.e., our allies, as a rule received ships of those same designs as were also built for the Soviet Navy. And the combat units being exported in those years were created with certain design differences from their Soviet analogs/prototypes. Above all this concerns the type and product list of models of onboard arms and technical equipment which were being installed in them and personnel habitability conditions.

To be more specific, our former allies received projects 613 and 641 diesel submarines; Project 61-m large ASW ships; at various times projects 30, 30-bis and 56 destroyers; Project 1234 small guided missile ships, projects 205 and 183-r guided missile patrol boats, projects 206 and 183 motor torpedo boats, projects 204 and 1124 small ASW ships, as well as projects 201 and 201-t ASW patrol boats, projects 254 and 266 ocean minesweepers, projects 257 and 253-l coastal minesweepers and a considerable number of combatant craft for various purposes of other designs.

Export deliveries included approximately the very same product list. India was the leading partner here until recently. It purchased from us for its Navy several Varshavyanka-Class diesel submarines (as it now is widely known, this design was developed in the recent past for replenishing fleets of Warsaw Pact countries and partially the Soviet Navy), a number of Project 61 large ASW ships, projects 1234 and 1124 small guided missile and ASW ships respectively, as well as Project 266 minesweepers and Project 205 guided missile patrol

boats. It must be emphasized that ships of Soviet designs which were exported, Varshavyanka-Class diesel submarines, small ASW and guided missile ships as well as minesweepers and guided missile patrol boats enjoyed a special demand from our foreign partners.

[Tyurin] That was then, before the USSR disintegrated. But how are things now?

[Belyshev] A study of the world naval arms market showed that the demand for them has not decreased at the present time, but such deliveries from our country were reduced sharply in recent years. We see the principal reasons to be the absence of a direct incentive for the Navy and the industry enterprises fabricating export products to perform this work that is profitable for Russia, and also the absence of necessary funds not just for building export ships, but even for preparing them for sale abroad from those present in the Navy.

[Tyurin] Just what reserves does the Navy have for this?

[Belyshev] One such direction is to identify the product list of naval equipment and arms as a whole, i.e., not just ships, for purposes of selling the latter for export. The Navy Shipbuilding Directorate and armament directorates analyzed their entire product list of arms and military equipment. As a result, a list of ships, arms and military equipment that were advisable to sell for export was determined both from what is present in the Navy as well as presently manufactured by industry enterprises. We could offer these products to foreign clients without detriment to the Navy's combat readiness. It must be clarified without fail that the removal of ships, arms and military equipment from the Navy *basically* is dictated by the reduced appropriations for Navy ordering directorates for development, construction and repair, as well as by surpluses of certain stockpiles of arms and military equipment at depots and in arsenals.

[Tyurin] Specifically what could we sell abroad today?

[Belyshev] As applied to the possibilities of selling ships... In Russia and Ukraine there are 11 and 10 units respectively of large and medium displacement in a stage of incomplete construction. Work performed under these yard orders as of the present time has been paid for by the Navy. These ships are the property of the client, the Navy, or to be more precise, of the entire CIS. Resolution of the question of affiliation of ships which are at Ukraine's yards remains with the politicians for now. Technical readiness of incomplete orders of this group is three at 70 percent (for Russia's yards) and fifteen at 85 percent (in Ukraine).

The second group is made up of combatant ships for various purposes already built earlier and stationed in all fleets of the CIS, and which at the present time have not been overhauled. The product list of these ships built from the 1960's through the 1980's is rather vast, from combatant craft to first-rank ships, and essentially encompasses all basic designs of today's Navy. This

includes Kiev-Class air-capable cruisers, Nikolayev-Class large ASW ships, Bodryy-Class patrol ships, and a large group of guided missile, landing and mine countermeasures ships as well as Varshavyanka-Class and Project 641 diesel submarines.

Of that which is at depots and in arsenals the Navy can offer for sale abroad various models of modern gun, mine-torpedo, ASW and mine countermeasures ordnance; electronic, sonar and radiotechnical ship materiel; as well as gun ammunition for systems being offered for export.

[Tyurin] Tell me, what awaits those ships of ours not sold abroad and which will not be able to be repaired in time at our yards?

[Belyshev] Judge for yourself: in 1992 the degree to which the Navy's requirements for repair and maintenance of the ship order of battle are being met is only 30 percent of what is needed! The reason lies in the Navy's lack of funds, although these ships can be considered for subsequent restoration (after lay-up) and activation with the Fleet based on their technical condition and service life. Otherwise they may be offered for subsequent sale for export because of the absence of repairs. But with respect to the need for appropriations required this year for repair and maintenance of naval ships, the Navy is forced to do the following: stop repairs in 1992 and move about 60 units from repair to lay-up, and turn over about 10 units for scrap; *additionally* in the current year eliminate over 70 ships from its order of battle and also postpone until later the repair of over 70 ships previously planned for accommodation at yards in 1992. Some units in this group also are to be laid up. Considering that the numerical strength of the CIS Navy *must be reduced in stages* by 1995, as well as the firm trend toward growing budget difficulties, in the next few years one should expect a constant increase in the number of surface combatants, submarines and other units *not accommodated* for repair!

[Tyurin] Which fleet has the most serious repair situation?

[Belyshev] It is most serious in the Pacific Fleet. Until recently we had the practice where some kinds of repair of surface combatants are performed at the building yard, which has everything necessary for this. Now this has turned against us: because of the impossibility of getting repairs at the Nikolayev Black Sea Shipyard, evidently it will be necessary to lay up the air-capable cruisers Minsk and Novorossiysk, keeping them in the Fleet. The fate of the large ASW ships Nikolayev and Tashkent, which until recently also were undergoing repairs and modernization there at the Nikolayev Shipyard imeni 61 Communards, can most likely turn out differently—after termination of repair, the first of them then will set off for the reserve and the other for scrap. Being written off to the reserve evidently also awaits the patrol ship Gordelivyy and a number of other gun-firing, landing and mine countermeasures ships of various

ranks—repairs being performed on them until recently will be stopped. The picture is relatively easier in other fleets, but the fate of ships is similar: interruption of repairs, removal to the reserve, and a minimum of chances for restoration... A number of units possibly will be leased.

[Tyurin] Just what does the Navy suggest in this situation? What are its contacts with the Russian leadership?

[Belyshev] As already noted, Russia declared itself the successor to the USSR and its Armed Forces. Based on that state of affairs, the Navy command and Russian Federation government presently are working out joint decisions on preserving the Navy and those industrial structures which support its vital activities, including military shipbuilding. The following solution is seen: with the present situation in the country's economy, in attempting to reduce defense resources, state structures must proceed from the minimum necessary level of the Navy order of battle which permits performing missions assigned the Navy. That level is determined by government documents on the Navy development concept and we cannot go below that. With constantly changing prices and state entities' inability to control their growth factors, a monetary expression of allocated resources cannot be taken as the basis for planning even for a year ahead. Therefore state economic and finance entities must orient themselves toward ensuring creation of the requisite number of ships, weapons and technical equipment and keeping them in operation. Then the Navy, military shipbuilding, and other sectors of the defense industry will be preserved.

On the other hand, sources of nonbudget financing, including funds from the sale of ships and vessels abroad both from the present makeup of the Navy as well as Navy ships, arms and equipment being produced in the export version can help to solve this problem. As already noted, at first we can sell for export the arms and military equipment surpluses stored at fleet depots and arsenals.

We believe that currency assets from the sale of Navy ships, arms and military equipment also can be obtained by selling ships whose construction is being stopped at shipyards, either after appropriate completion, or in their present (incomplete) form, or after being taken apart for scrap metal. There also are a number of other options we have studied...

[Tyurin] Just what is necessary for implementing those proposals?

[Belyshev] The following:

- organize work in accordance with Russian government documents adopted of late about the procedure for selling written-off and obsolete combatant ships, vessels and other materiel in domestic and foreign markets, as well as selling ships whose construction has been stopped during conversion and ships and vessels which have been inactivated for the purpose of their subsequent recycling;

- establish the Navy as a general client of work and services in industry for placing the aforementioned naval equipment in an export version on a contractual basis;
- permit the Navy to seek out foreign purchasing firms, negotiate with them and sign protocols on the parties' intentions;
- basically direct nonbudget financing toward implementing programs for social protection of servicemen and development of the infrastructure of fleets;
- delegate to the Navy the right of a general client for nonbudget financing and of a state guarantor in concluding contracts with Russian and foreign investors.

[Tyurin] In your opinion who should be responsible for preparing ships and naval equipment for sale and for the sale itself? How will functions be divided among interested structures? How will the profit be divided?

[Belyshev] In our view, all activity of preparing for the sale, including recycling of ships, military equipment and arms, should be performed by specialized state and commercial organizations. The following functions should be assigned to our fleet entities and Navy ordering directorates:

- determining (together with the CIS Navy General Staff Operations Directorate) the list and quantity of arms and military equipment which can or must be recycled or sold abroad without detriment to the fleet;
- conducting a search for investors and concluding contracts with them or with appropriate state structures for performance of all work, including the sale of arms and military equipment or utilizable scrap;
- it stands to reason that contracts must provide for the most favorable conditions for the Navy and of course for Russia as the owner of objects of recycling and sale. We consider the following ratios of net profit withholdings to be acceptable, for example: Navy—50 percent; an organization offering technology and tools for taking apart arms and military equipment for scrap metal, and immediate performers of this work—25 percent; investor—10 percent; industrial enterprise—10 percent; bonus payment and so on—5 percent...

In choosing technologies we will place emphasis on domestic organizations. Ship repair yards of industry and the Navy, which to a considerable extent have the necessary experience, knowledge and rigging, must become primary performers of the work of taking apart ships, vessels, arms and military equipment.

To perform the above work, the Navy's ordering directorates should open their own current accounts and should provide for positions or special subunits for experienced officer-specialists (discharged to the reserve or retired). The task of such subunits will include coordinating the activity of state, commercial and military structures. Bonus payments for all natural persons involved in the given work should be made in the form of

net profit withholdings. Finance entities of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Navy will have to plan appropriate amounts during the first 2-3 years (the initial period) to support ordering directorates in unfolding all activity and to pay for initial expenses. Subsequently all contracts with state and commercial structures will have to be paid only from profit and on a compensatory basis.

Footnotes

1. MORSKOY SBORNIK, No 7, 1992, p 3.

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CIS: REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

CIS Sport-Technical Organizations Meet

92UM1472A Moscow PATRIOT in Russian

No 37, Sep 92 (signed to press 15 Sept 92) p 2

[Unattributed Article: "They Favored Collaboration"]

[Text] In Tashkent a meeting was held for the leaders of the defense sports-technical organizations (societies) [OSTO] of the CIS member states. This was convened upon the initiative of the Central Council of the Vatanparvar OSO [defense sports organization] of the Republic of Uzbekistan supported by the leaders of the OSTO of the independent states and the Central Council of the CIS OSTO Union. The idea of the conference was approved by the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan A.I. Karimov, and by the republic Ministry of Defense.

Participating in the conference were delegations from the Central Council of OSTO of the Republic of Armenia, the OSTO Council of the Republic of Belarus, the DOSAAF Central Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the OSTO Central Council of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, the OSTO Council of the Russian Federation, the OSO Central Committee of the Republic of Tajikistan, the OSTO Central Council of Turkmenistan, the Central Council of the Vatanparvar OSO of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the OSO Central Committee of Ukraine and the Central Council of the CIS OSTO Union.

The conference participants were united in the view that the common goals and tasks of the defense sports-technical organizations in the independent states and the presence of ties between them which had come into being over many years required the strengthening of mutually advantageous collaboration, a constant coordinating of efforts, an exchange of experience and mutual aid on all question comprising their competence. The leaders of the CIS OSTO signed a protocol on the intentions of the parties on the question of coordination and ensuring joint activities under present-day conditions. A regulation was adopted on the Council of the Chairmen of the Defense Organizations (Societies) of the independent states. They agreed to make such meetings

regular and plan to meet next time in the capital of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, Bishkek.

It is important the the Tashkent conference was held on the threshold of the Bishkek Meeting of the Heads of the CIS Member States which opened on 25 September, and where great attention is to be given to defense questions.

It is to be hoped that the voice of the leaders of the defense organizations will be heard at the meeting.

In the next issue of PATRIOT, you can read in detail on the Tashkent conference of the OSTO leaders of the independent CIS states.

INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

Bizhan Refutes Russian Claims of "Privatization" of Sevastopol Military Schools*92UM1444C Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian
2 Sept 92 p 1*

[Interview with Colonel-General Ivan Bizhan, Ukraine first deputy defense minister, by NARODNA ARMIYA correspondent Lieutenant-Colonel Mikhail Poselenov: "Who Desires Destabilization?"; place and date not given; first two paragraphs are NARODNA ARMIYA introduction]

[Text] Published in the 1 September 1992 edition of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA was a short article carrying the title "Ukraine's Ministry of Defense Privatizes Naval Schools; Black Sea Fleet Commander Stands Opposed." The writer of the article, Vladimir Maryukha, was quite emphatic: "Outright privatization was the term used by Black Sea Fleet Commander Admiral Igor Kasatonov in his conversation with me relative to the Ukraine's Ministry of Defense's changing the subordination of the Sevastopol higher naval schools."

What actually happened in Sevastopol? To shed some light on the situation, Lieutenant Colonel Mikhail Poselenov, our correspondent, interviewed Colonel General Ivan Bizhan, first deputy defense minister of Ukraine.

[NARODNA ARMIYA] Ivan Vasilyevich, our fellow journalists in Moscow are referring to the trip made to Sevastopol by the group of Ukrainian servicemen headed by Colonel Pilipchuk as something bordering on the illegal. They also speak of the happenings in the ChVVMU [Black Sea Higher Naval School imeni Nakhimov] as a "one-act comedy." Please clarify the situation.

[Bizhan] Here is what I will say in that regard. Black Sea Fleet Commander Kasatonov should not have termed the work carried out by our Military Education Directorate group in the Sevastopol schools "outright privatization." For all 34 schools located on Ukraine's soil (including those in Sevastopol) were rendered subordinate to Ukraine as early as 24 August 1991, by the Supreme Council Decree on Military Units in Ukraine. This being the case, they are included in the system of reorganization of military education in Ukraine, and that leaves no room for doubt.

In spite of that, VMF [Navy] Commander Chernavin, ignoring that legal status and the legal situation involving the schools, continued to exert illegal efforts to retain them under his subordination. In addition, in issuing those orders, attempts were also made to assemble a body of students. This in spite of the fact that we had plans of an entirely different nature. When the group of our officers from the Military Education Directorate arrived at the schools to implement the reorganization programs and ascertain the state of readiness of the schools for the coming labor year, Rear Admiral

Denisenkov, the chief of the ChVVMU imeni Nakhimov, stood in clear opposition, hindering the commission's work. He exhibited a lack of appreciation and acknowledgement of the actual situation and the realities of the law concerning the school. For that reason, it was natural that the decision was made in the Ministry of Defense to relieve Denisenkov of his duties. There was nothing else that could be done.

[NARODNA ARMIYA] How much time was required for that decision to be made?

[Bizhan] The decision was made after the situation was appraised, and after the rear admiral undertook his actions against the group sent by the Ministry of Defense.

[NARODNA ARMIYA] How did Denisenkov react to his removal? Did he resist?

[Bizhan] According to reports made to me, he did nothing to fight back. However, having heard the order, he said that he cannot accept the order as a legal action, since the school after all is not subordinated to Ukraine's Ministry of Defense and that some confirmation of the legality of the order should be forthcoming from the Russian Federation's Ministry of Defense.

[NARODNA ARMIYA] The lack of logic in his position shows up clearly here. Could it be that he was not familiar with the resolutions passed by our Supreme Council?

[Bizhan] I think that that is not the case. Imagine an educated person, especially one holding such a post, exhibiting a lack of awareness! He simply refuted them; perhaps there were other reasons, other motives. What Denisenkov did was to continue abetting the illegal acts taken against the school on the part of CIS VMF Admiral Chernavin. He obviously was pleased with the situation as it stood, or perhaps he had acted under pressure.

[NARODNA ARMIYA] Nonetheless, the principal instrument here most likely was Admiral Kasatonov.

[Bizhan] We have discussed the first situation. If we are to speak of Kasatonov and his actions, the following must be said at the outset. Those schools did not then, nor do they now, serve as elements of the Black Sea Fleet structure.

At the time of existence of the Soviet Union, its Armed Forces, its Navy, the schools were subordinate to the commander of the Union Navy. They never were subordinated to the Black Sea Fleet structure. However, when the decision was made to create the CIS in December of 1991, you will recall that one of the provisions was that, with the signing of the agreement, all former central control structures of the Union located on the soil of the states entering into the agreement would cease to function as such. Therefore, no structures, including those of the former Ministry of Defense, commander-in-chief's office of the former VMF, or the former Soviet Army, could legally function on the soil of Ukraine. This stands

to reason. Nonetheless, efforts were still illegally exerted to interfere, issue orders, and direct those military schools. And so, this being the case, the next step was taken. In July of this year, Kasatonov made the decision to place those schools under his subordination within the Black Sea Fleet structure. This is manifestly against the law, illegal acts committed on the soil of an independent state. The fact is that the schools of which we are speaking have been under Ukrainian jurisdiction since August of 1991.

It goes without saying that we could not find that kind of situation acceptable. The subsequently issued Order No 123 declared those acts to be out of concert with the law and placed the schools directly under the Military Education Directorate of our Ministry of Defense.

When our group undertook its work in the school, Kasatonov—and even Admiral Gromov, who now occupies the post of commander of the Navy of Russia—started to send there orders addressing this topic, open threats against the new military authorities and school head, requiring that all activities be halted and nothing new initiated, since the schools were supposed to be subordinated to them and the schools' future had not yet been decided. For that reason, all activities must be suspended. In addition, Admiral Kasatonov threatened the Ministry of Defense representatives openly that, if they did not terminate their work in the school, this would give rise to the launching of acts which at one time had been taken against the komendatura. On 31 August, Kasatonov went ahead to make the threat a reality. He issued an order for a gathering of officers to be held there, i.e., for a gathering of representatives of all ships and large units, coordinating councils of Black Sea Fleet officer assemblies, Military Council members, and 60 naval infantrymen, which he then sent to the school so that they could implement the necessary measure.

When this was reported to me, I immediately attempted to locate Kasatonov, but he was not available to me. In other words, he was ignoring me.

I think that Admiral Kasatonov's actions were the straw that broke the back of patience. It is my feeling that that kind of person should not be in command of the Black Sea Fleet in such a difficult political period.

I subsequently contacted Admiral Gromov—the commander of the Russian Navy, demanding that such acts of provocation be halted within the next 20 or 30 minutes, otherwise I would be forced to take appropriate action.

[NARODNA ARMIYA] The situation is reminiscent of the Caribbean Crisis.

[Bizhan] Yes, yes. (Colonel General Bizhan was smiling as he said that, then continued in a serious tone.) Well, what else to do in this, a case of an open and naked act of provocation committed by a military organization subordinated to two Presidents against a school legally subordinated to Ukraine's Ministry of Defense. What

else could be said to those military leaders? Well, Admiral Gromov—to his credit, I must admit—rang me 5 minutes later, saying: "Ivan Vasilyevich, you will see no more naval infantrymen or acts of provocation."

I telephoned the school to be informed that the naval infantry had indeed boarded vehicles and departed from the school.

[NARODNA ARMIYA] Ivan Vasilyevich, I have heard—by the tip of my ear, so to speak—that present at that time at the school was Russian People's Deputy Sergey Shakhray.

[Bizhan] Yes, Sergey Mikhaylovich Shakhray was one of the guests. I rang there and asked for him. During our conversation, I said that I was simply interested in the kind of problems he was working on at the school. Sergey Mikhaylovich answered that he was at the school on the basis of an order issued by the Minister of Defense of Ukraine.

[NARODNA ARMIYA] Could he have been carrying out a task levied by someone in the Russian leadership?

[Bizhan] Well, he made no mention of anything of the sort, relative to whether or not this was so. Be that as it may, he did say that he was there to find out what he could concerning the order and the existing situation. I then put to him the question: "Sergey Mikhaylovich, how would you feel if a Ukrainian people's deputy or representatives of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense were to show up all of a sudden at some school located on Russian soil to determine whether an order issued by Russian Federation Minister of Defense Grachev is legal or illegal?"

He answered by saying that the situations were different. I countered by stating that I did not see how the situations differed. This happened to be an area belonging to the state of Ukraine, with the school subordinated to Ukraine, therefore we possess the right to do what we choose and take whatever measures we wish relative to the school. I continued by telling him the following. I simply requested that he bear in mind that those Sevastopol schools are not a part of the Black Sea Fleet structure; that they do not constitute a topic for talks between state delegations in the resolution of problems relating to the Black Sea Fleet. Furthermore, the schools are not included in the Strategic Forces or in the Unified Armed Forces of the CIS, for that matter. They are simply subordinated to the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.

Once again I will give People's Deputy Shakhray his due. In his speech at the gathering, he related literally everything I had said to him in connection with the schools: They are not a part of the Black Sea Fleet structure; are not subordinated to CIS Navy Headquarters; and they constitute structural bodies of Ukraine. There is an order issued by Ukraine's minister of defense, and it must be carried out. That is why he invited everyone to the

gathering, to effect calm and stability, promising that all other problems will be taken up at the respective levels.

In my conversation with Shakhrai, I told him additionally that if the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Defense are interested in the training of officer cadre using our facilities, this comes under an existing agreement specially written to fit the framework of the CIS. And that if some details of this agreement require clarification, everything could be resolved bilaterally. This could come about only with the realization that the schools are situated on the soil of Ukraine and belong to the latter.

That is the situation relative to the schools. So, I am surprised at why a newspaper such as KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, whose chief editor has stated time and again a desire to become the publication of the CIS Armed Forces, can print unverified and hostile information from Sevastopol relative to events taking place in school. The problems certainly can be put in proper perspective.

Russian Defense Ministry Denies Responsibility in 'Kometa' Incident

92UM1474B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 18 Sep 92 p 1

[Report from Russian Federation Ministry of Defense Press Service: "The Name of the Pilot Who Attacked the 'Kometa' Has Been Established"]

[Text] Reports are continuing to appear in the mass media on an intervention of Russian troops that supposedly took place in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. Attempts are unceasing in particular to shift responsibility onto the Russians for the grave consequences of the strafing by a helicopter, with no distinguishing markings, of a Kometa class civilian vessel with vacationers and refugees on board that was making a run from Batumi to Sochi on August 27. Eleven people were injured and one was killed as a result of this criminal act.

The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation has received proof that incontrovertibly testifies to the fact that the helicopter was operating under the command of the Georgians. The last name of the pilot—Maysuradze—is also known. He could not help but see and know that he was using combat weaponry against peaceful citizens. The majority of the passengers on the civilian vessel were Russians. The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation regards this inhuman act of violence against unarmed people as the complete disdain of the Georgians for the norms of international law.

A host of other dangerous actions that create a real threat to the lives of Russian servicemen and the members of their families on the territory of Georgia also cannot be regarded any other way. The provocative strafings of military units, military rest homes, garrisons and facilities, armed raids, the taking of hostages—all of this is the alarming reality of recent times. Georgian helicopters are appearing more and more often over places densely

populated with the Russian-speaking population and firing on them. It is known that the Georgians have concentrated a large quantity of aerial bombs of various calibers, including 250-kilogram bombs, at the Sukhumi airfield.

The Ministry of Defense of Russia declares that the Russian troops that are in the conflict zone have maintained and will maintain neutrality. If the criminal acts against the Russian-speaking population using helicopters do not stop, however, the Ministry of Defense of Russia reserves the right to take steps to stop this aerial piracy.

Georgians Accused on Air Operations

92UM1516B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 26 Sep 92 p 1

[Report under the rubric "The Press Service of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation Reports": "Facts Are a Stubborn Thing"]

[Text] The Georgians reacted with acute hostility to a recent statement by the Ministry of Defense of Russia on unlawful acts inflicted upon Russian troops and the civilian population in Abkhazia.

Representatives of Georgia absolutely denied the obvious facts, including the employment of combat helicopters in the continuing fratricidal conflict. Here are some new facts. On 23 September three Georgian combat helicopter and one Su-25 aircraft bombed the civilian communities of Tkvarcheli, Arasadykhi and Gvadi. There were killed and wounded among the civilian population. That same day two Russian Mi-8 helicopters carrying food from Gudauta to Tkvarcheli were forced to land at Sukhumi and were inspected by Georgians.

Once again, Georgian authorities are attempting to cover up the facts and prevent the general public from learning the truth.

Status of Russian Troops in Tajikistan

92UM1516A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 Sep 92 p 1

[Article by Colonel Anatoliy Ladin: "Russian Troops in Tajikistan Are Maintaining Neutrality, But They Need Support"]

[Text] Increasingly more alarming reports are coming in from Tajikistan, engulfed in the flames of civil war.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already repeatedly reported on the difficult situation of troops of the 201st Motorized Rifle Division stationed in Tajikistan. They are not intervening in the bloody regional conflict, but they have felt powerful psychological pressure literally from the first days of the armed conflict. That was at the beginning. Today things are not limited to verbal threats of

reprisals and all sorts of ultimatums. It is as though they are attempting to "speak" to the Russian servicemen through weapons.

At 23:20, local time, on 22 September a group of unknown people dressed in camouflage uniforms and armed with assault rifles broke through into the position of a PVO [Air Defense] electronic battalion on the outskirts of the Tajik capital. Lt-Col Vyacheslav Tekuchev, commander of the electronic brigade, provides the following account of what happened.

"Taking advantage of the dark, the attackers arrived at the unit in two motor vehicles, cut through the barbed-wire obstacle and suddenly appeared near the mess hall."

According to Tekuchev the militants succeeded in learning where the unit duty officer was located. They headed for there on the run. That night Sr Lt Vladimir Larin was the duty officer. The door to the barracks in which he and other members of the daily duty detail were located was locked. Through the peephole he saw a figure in a military uniform and, suspecting nothing, disengaged the lock. He was immediately struck in the chest with an assault rifle. Three of the assailants wrestled the officer to the floor, bound his hands and beat him on the head. They simultaneously searched him for the keys to the weapons room. They ripped out the telephone cords and smashed the intercom radio linking the room to the command post. Locating his key chain, they feverishly attempted to find their way to the rifle racks.

The thugs had not succeeded in opening the room where the weapons were stored when a siren went off. The assailants booty consisted of the duty officer's pistol and wristwatch.

A preliminary investigation has shown that the assailants do not belong to any political group. According to some reports, these were typical criminals, who, in the difficult situation in Dushanbe today, are attempting to achieve their avaricious goals. And their first priority is the acquisition of weapons.

When he told about this incident, Col Tekuchev underscored the fact that the radioelectronic subunits under his command and scattered throughout Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are in extremely difficult circumstances. This is the first such open attack for purposes of stealing weapons. Only officers perform guard duty. It is becoming increasingly more difficult to provide the separate radioelectronic sites with food, fuel, wood and coal for burning.

The units are having difficulties not just in obtaining the essentials, however. The political situation is so acute that the Russian military have to carefully forecast literally their every move. Regarding statements in the press to the effect that servicemen of the formation patrol the streets of Dushanbe together with the police and volunteers, Lt Col Svyatoslav Nabadorov, chief of staff of the 201st Motorized Rifle Division, says that

such a move would draw Russian servicemen into the political processes transpiring in the republic. The division, he stressed, has maintained and continues to maintain neutrality. Helping to maintain public order is not part of its job.

Svyatoslav Nabadorov also said that the division is prepared to provide guards for trans-shipment points if the opposing parties will depart from there. No such agreement was reached, however. Formation forces are therefore guarding only the Nurek GES [Hydroelectric Power Plant] today.

While relative calm prevails in Dushanbe for now, the situation has heated up even more in Kurgan-Tyube, where one of the division's regiments is stationed.

There has been intense shelling in its area in the past two days. It was reported to me at regimental headquarters that the opposition forces, taking advantage of an order issued by Akbarsho Iskandarov, acting president of the republic, have launched an operation to cleanse the city of emigrants from Kulyab Oblast. Grenade launchers are being used in the combat operations, begun literally at the unit gate.

Ministry of Defense Statement on 201st Motorized-Rifle Division

92UM1519A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Sep 92 p 1

[Statement From the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation]

[Text] Due to the acute exacerbation of the situation in the Republic of Tajikistan, particularly Kurgan-Tyube Oblast, the increased frequency of threats against military personnel of the Russian Federation, the taking of hostages and the capture of equipment and weapons which are then employed in combat operations, and in response to an appeal from the leadership of the Republic of Tajikistan to the government of Russia, the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation is announcing a decision to reinforce units of the 201st MSD [Motorized-Rifle Division] immediately. The latter have been issued strict instructions to eliminate the theft of weapons, combat equipment and ammunition belonging to the Russian forces, as well as acts of outlawry by hostile elements against Russian servicemen and their families.

The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation appeals to all political parties and public movements of the Republic of Tajikistan to demonstrate good will and prudence and to halt the internecine conflicts which are resulting in new and totally unjustified casualties.

The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation warns that responsibility for a continuation of acts of outlawry against Russian military units stationed in the

Republic of Tajikistan and their possible consequences will be borne entirely and completely by those who initiate them.

UKRAINE

Correspondent Defends General Accused of Weapons Transfer

92UM1444A Kiev GOLOS UKRAINY in Russian
29 Aug 92 p 8

[Article by GOLOS UKRAINY correspondent Mikhail Vasilashko, datelined in Khmelnytskyi Oblast: "A Game Without Rules, or Who Will Defend General Perevalov?"; first paragraph is GOLOS UKRAINY introduction]

[Text] In the beginning of summer, GOLOS UKRAINY received a letter written by members of the Starokonstantinov Officer Union. The official report stated that General Perevalov, acting with the permission of Air Force authorities, organized a flight of a transport aircraft to Komsomolsk-on-Amur, and this for personal purposes, in that he landed with large amounts of food items. In addition, he allegedly obstructed the work of officers and workers of the Security Service at the time of the customs inspection to be carried out at the Mirgorod airport. This event was reported in the Kiev and local press without verification. At that time, the Vinnitsa Garrison military procuracy office filed criminal charges, on the basis of transfer of prohibited amounts of food items and other illegal actions on the part of officers.

While an investigation was under way and journalists were checking on the veracity of the information provided in the letter received by GOLOS UKRAINY, an initiative group of the Starokonstantinov organization of the Ukraine Officer Union lost no time, digging up more and more "facts" relative to abuses committed by General Privalov (Translator: name translated as stated). People from Kiev, Vinnitsa, and Odessa started to arrive at Starokonstantinov like pilgrims visiting a holy land, to check into the matter. The findings arrived at by many months of investigation were set down in a special report by Lieutenant Colonel Guk and made available to all high levels of the state and to leaders of public organizations. Mister Guk described the basic situation in a written report carrying the insinuating title of "Six SU-24 Aircraft Committed to Fly from Our Garrison" (NARODNAYA ARMIYA, 12 August of this year). The major allegation was Perevalov's flight to Komsomolsk-on-Amur.

However, if one looks at the big picture, that is, from the state's point of view, the major allegation is made in that report's title. Mister Guk, presenting his report in the name of the President and of other highly-placed officials of the rayon SOU [Ukraine Officer Union], attempts to lead the reader to believe that Division Commander Perevalov was involved in the theft of the

six aircraft. This however is difficult to accept. I personally had the opportunity of spending some time with a group of journalists in the division after the unfortunate occurrence. We put the question point-blank to counter-intelligence and leaders of the oblast division of the SBU [Ukraine Security Service]: Was General Perevalov indeed involved in the transfer? I am still positive that if the President, still not knowing how the Supreme Council would react, had the slightest doubt about the division commander's participation, he would not hesitate to point his finger at Perevalov. However, in that case, we would definitely hear the following statement made:

"If Perevalov were mixed up in a plot with Moscow, he could have moved his entire division into Russia, where he would be rewarded with promotion to army commander."

The prediction became a reality. Our newspaper reported to its readers on two occasions how Shaposhnikov greeted air pirates with champagne, how he so generously handed out stars, new duties, and foreign assignments.

In reality, Perevalov at that time was fruitfully engaged in improving the large unit's combat readiness. He was able to organize just about the best command post, even during throes of the economic crisis. It should be noted that the airfield command post is not a small infantry point. It is a large technical complex designed to control flights, carry out combat missions, prevent emergency situations, etc. In addition to that, he was deeply involved in flight personnel training.

Nonetheless, the above aspect of the situation was not included in Lieutenant Colonel Guk's plans; he went ahead and collected pieces of gossip. That is the only conclusion one can make, what with an assertion such as "General Perevalov made attempts at the Mirgorod Airfield to keep Colonel Alekseyev and SBU representatives from inspecting the aircraft."

Now that the procuracy office has completed its investigation and the journalists their verification, one can now say without reservation: There was nothing of a criminal nature in Perevalov's actions. I substantiate this by quoting from one of the many documents that have come into my possession.

General L. P. Furs: "In Mirgorod on 21 April 1992, after the An-12 aircraft landed, General Perevalov rang the airfield duty flight office to request that I organize an inspection of the aircraft, which I did accomplish. According to reports filed by the officers who carried out the inspection, Perevalov did nothing to hinder the aircraft inspection. Colonel V. A. Alekseyev was not present during the inspection." I would only add that the general did in fact fly to his home aboard an aircraft belonging to a neighboring large unit, on a regularly-scheduled flight, and he was extended basic human rights, none of which he violated.

It is the finding of Colonel I. P. Malyuzin, military procurator of the Khmelnytskyi Garrison, that in none of the 11 counts listed in the report that served as the basis for the Starokonstantinov SOU organization's allegations was there any cause for regarding as criminally offensive the actions of General Perevalov. In that connection, each allegation is loaded with prejudice, to put it mildly.

The following is some factual information.

Lieutenant Colonel Guk writes the following:

"General Perevalov, who is not a professional hunter, did acquire from the military depot a rifled weapon, an SKS carbine, paying the sum of 63 rubles." But listen to what the facts say. Receipt number 4175 made out by Military Unit 55242 states that Perevalov paid the amount of 5,106 rubles for the carbine, as per order number 21-2-551. The weapon is registered with the oblast internal affairs administration under the number 4175. The hunting license is numbered 410801. It is a mystery whence Mister Guk obtained the figure "63." He must be operating on the basis of the old Russian saying about "putting someone on the hook and letting him get off himself."

In the same category is the following comparably picturesque assertion: **"The commander of Military Unit 19074, Major General Perevalov, concluded a deal with the firm Glavbolgarstroy to transfer freight and people to the town of Machulishche aboard an An-26 aircraft without making the usual hauling arrangement. The sum of 60,000 rubles was made available by personal request of Perevalov."** This is something the reader can judge for himself. He can even conclude that someone pocketed the money. The latter in reality went to the Army finance office. Can it be that this kind of transfer is prohibited by the minister of defense? The answer to that is "no."

Instead of proceeding with work that is difficult and purposeful, with the goal of setting affairs straight in the Army and improving the leadership and forms of combat training, the general is forced to run all over Ukraine to gather statements and evidence that he took nothing there, stole nothing here, and did not profit in any instance. In spite of the utter absurdity of the allegations and failure to observe the sacred legal principle of presumption of innocence, the general is still able to joke:

"Thank God they are saying or writing nothing about my having ties to Martian intelligence. In that case, how could I obtain from Martians proof that I am not an agent for other worlds?! I would not live long enough to fly there in my Su-24."

A joke is a joke, gentlemen, but we should not be surprised at what the members of the Starokonstantinov division of the SOU come up with. They have adopted the methods—and this is the worst aspect—of the investigators of 1938. **"I, Senior Warrant Officer Kovalchuk, Boris Yakovlevich, do hereby state that Major Moskovets**

threatened me during an interrogation, telling me that my failure to furnish evidence incriminating Perevalov could have me discharged from the Armed Forces. Also present was a lieutenant-colonel whose name I do not know. 7-07-92." This kind of threat, but this time one made by Lieutenant Colonel Nikitin, was also submitted in writing by Major Ivanov.

With the above evidence in hand, it would now be time to raise the question of possibly bringing charges against that kind of SOU boys for illegal actions. However, what appeals to me more is the position taken by Major General Martirosyan in an address he delivered to members of the Khmelnytskyi area Officer Union:

"Comrades, let us dispense with this nonsense, this witch-hunt and chasing after enemies who do not exist, this fomenting of opposition in officer collectives. What you should do is direct your efforts to consolidation and strengthening of the Army's combat readiness. That is what is of primary importance today."

However, the Starokonstantinov people have not listened to reason. They have come out with levelling accusations at none other than the godfather of the SOU—Deputy Minister of Defense V. Mulyava—to the effect that he and the officers of the Ministry of Defense's Social and Psychological Service conducted a shoddy check on the allegations made against General Perevalov. What is the point here? This in my opinion is in the same class as criticism coming from speaker platforms of the Officer Assembly, which also amounts to a kind of pressure exerted by this authoritative Army structure so that—heaven forbid!—no assistance be provided the general.

Would someone be so kind as to answer this: Is the basic guarantee of legal protection not presently extended to generals? Must the fight over desks and posts be conducted so dishonestly? Could an officer's honor have actually fallen so low? It is high time that we all come to our senses, cease heaping abuse and insults, come to stand together, roll up our sleeves and go to work. And continue until we can do no more. Only then will it be possible to say who is worth how much.

Ukraine to Reform Military Education System

*92UM1444B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian
29 Aug 92 p 1*

[Article by Press Service, Ukraine Prime Minister: "For the Ukraine's Armed Forces"]

[Text] The Ukraine Cabinet of Ministers has issued the Decree on Reform of the Military Education System. The purpose is to improve the education of highly-qualified specialists for the Armed Forces by organizing a number of higher military schools. The schools will be the Armed Forces Academy in Kiev; Kharkov Military University; Kiev Military Humanities Institute; Odessa Ground Forces Institute; and the Sevastopol Naval Institute.

To provide high-quality education to candidates for admission to military schools and to render state assistance to the education of orphans, children of large families, and also children of participants in combat activities and clean-up operations in the wake of the Chernobyl accident, it has been decided to create the Kiev and Lvov Military Lyceums on the basis of the Kiev Suvorov Military School and the Lvov Specialized Boarding School, respectively, offering an intensive program of physical training for military service. The doors of the lyceums will open on 1 September 1992. Six additional lyceums offering intensive physical training will be opened at a later time—in Sumy, Kharkov, Donetsk, Simferopol, Chernigov, and Zhitomir.

The decree provides creating in the near future the Ministry of Defense Combined Institute; and military construction, military engineering, and military medicine departments at certain civilian VUZ's.

A list of higher schools intended to train students in the reserve officer program has been approved. Provision has been made to implement other measures dealing with military education system reform.

Diaspora Officers Seek Ways To Serve in Ukraine

AU0210145992 Kiev *MOLOD UKRAYINY*
in *Ukrainian* 18 Sep 92 p 2

[Report signed "S.T.": "Marching to the President's Reception Room"]

[Text] There are two unions of Ukrainian officers. The first—the Union of Officers of Ukraine—unites officers of the national Armed Forces while the second—the Union of Officers of the Ukrainian Diaspora [UOUD]—is a much smaller organization that deals with problems of Ukrainian servicemen serving in armies of other states. The vast majority of the UOUD members have a common objective: to serve in the army of their people.

Let us consider some figures. At present, 750,000 servicemen are stationed in Ukraine. The needs of the future Ukrainian army are limited to between 220,000 and 400,000 servicemen, among whom only 100,000 must be officers. In addition, 300,000 Ukrainian servicemen are presently doing their service outside Ukraine.

Consequently, there are more than enough people wishing to serve in the Ukrainian Army. It is logical that preference will be given to Ukrainian citizens. However, no less logical is the fact that the most competent professionals, irrespective of their address in the former Union, must serve in our army. (Provided, of course, that the foreign applicants are of Ukrainian origin).

It is precisely this second logic that has led the UOUD to suggest new ways of selecting people for service in the Armed Forces. Namely—to create the Main Attestation and Competition Commission [MACC], which would annually conduct strict examinations for officers: Those

who pass such examinations will be allowed to continue their service and those who do not will have to vacate their places for others, even for those still serving in CIS armies. Incidentally, they must also be able to pass the MACC examinations.

"The defense minister has generally expressed his approval of the proposals submitted by the Union of Officers of the Ukrainian Diaspora," says Colonel O. Slyusarev, chairman of the UOUD. "However, the relevant documents have not yet been adopted."

On 21 September, at 1100, officers of the diaspora will hold a rally at Independence Square [in Kiev], and at 1800, they will swear allegiance to Ukraine. The next day, after taking the oath, they will solemnly march through Khreshchatyk to the Presidential Residence and the Ministry of Defense. Having marched to the ministry, Slyusarev's composite regiment will ask: What will the Ukrainian state do with the army of those officers who were not lucky enough to get a Ukrainian residence permit [propyska]?

BALTIC STATES

Controversy Over Future Ownership of Military Plants in Latvia

92UN2060D Riga *DIENA* in *Latvian* 25 Jul 92 p 7

[Article by Dzintars Medenis "Everyone Wants the War Plants in Latvia"]

[Text] Riga, July 24. Recently, conflicting viewpoints have surfaced concerning the fate of the former USSR military industrial complex (MIC) plants. It should be noted that Riga alone has nine major MIC plants, and that Russian military experts have estimated the value of their real estate in the Baltics to be over 150 billion rubles.

The claimants are numerous, ranging from the various departments of the state, to the ranks of private entrepreneurs, and from among the institutions of the higher national authority, the Defense Ministry of the Republic of Latvia has a sharply different viewpoint. The leaders feel that only their department knows their specific needs, and only they would be able to successfully reorganize these plants to meet Latvian defense needs. Russia has not renounced claims to this property, either.

Of course, many officials, including Latvia's Minister of State, Janis Dinevics, disagree with the viewpoint of the Defense Ministry. Recently, when meeting with representatives of that ministry, he stated: "In order for these enterprises to survive the conditions of conversion, the production structure will have to be reorganized to produce national consumers' goods, as well. And then, are you going to be the businessmen here? No, that won't happen! You are still a budgetary institution. You have to operate under the principle of state requisitions."

Eriks Tilgrass, advisor to the Minister of State, in an interview with DIENA, told us that in the talks with Russia on the withdrawal of its military forces from Latvia, a new position has crystallized in the latest round of talks: joint ventures could be created on the basis of these plants. The advisor saw this joint action as obvious progress, because, up until now, the Russian side had not acknowledged any claims of Latvian ownership of these plants. In the event that a joint venture is formed, Russia will not raise any objections to Latvia being considered as the managing owner of these military industrial complex plants.

The eastern neighbor is interested in seeing these factories continue their operations, because the plants produce goods that are vitally needed by Russia. For instance, the tank and submarine repair plant located in Riga. DIENA already reported that the 177th repair shipyard in Bolderaja was repairing a submarine promised to Libya, which raised objections, even on an international scale. If Latvia, nevertheless, takes over these plants entirely, it will not be possible to continue full-scale production, because problems will arise with respect to the supply of essential raw materials, as well as a contingent of qualified specialists. E. Tilgrass said there was no basis for the viewpoint that the nine plants located in Riga are only the tip of the military industrial complex iceberg. "Riga does have garage complexes and other similar insignificant spaces still occupied by the USSR military monster," said E. Tilgrass.

Chief of the Armament and Supply Board of the Defense Ministry of the Republic of Latvia, Pauls Jekabsons, at a meeting at the Defense Ministry, gave the example of Israel, where all production, which is related to the military infrastructure, is under the control of their defense department. They have their plants run by businessmen, who are willing to fill the army's orders while running their own business. The Defense Ministry here wants to operate similarly. In addition, the Latvian defense forces are unique in that they will also perform various civilian functions—they will finance cartography and geodesy, civil defense, as well as reestablish the national borders. According to Defense Minister Talavs Jundzis: "Increase our budgetary resources, and we will leave you alone, because then we will not have to produce what we need in Latvia, but can buy it from Japan, France or the United States."

According to the government's resolution, individual plants are turned over to a ministry or to municipal control. The viewpoint of the Defense Ministry is that many of these plants are being turned over "not according to proper ownership". When other ministries get property from the military industrial complexes, it is not rare for them to lease the property to firms, which, as the saying goes, skin the Defense Ministry alive, when it comes to paying for the manufactured products. T. Jundzis feels that "there is also negligence on the part of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia, because it has not adopted any regulatory acts, which would dictate that sales be conducted under more lenient

terms." In this manner, the Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia also cheats itself, because the budgetary resources of the ministries suffer, and along with that, the whole state budget. J. Dinevics: "Alright, we'll work out this consideration in the Supreme Council resolutions so that the firms are fighting over the orders."

Some army property has also been turned over to the Ministry of Architecture and Construction of the Republic of Latvia. The Ministry workers explained: "Naturally, the Ministry doesn't have the resources to organize production in these plants. The Ministry should sooner be regarded as a coordinator, an organizer of competition among commercial organizations that wish to continue production within this property. This property is included in the list of property eligible for privatization in the first round. Therefore, the Ministry is only performing the supervisory functions temporarily."

Latvian Ministry of Defense Reorganization Proposed

92UN2060B Riga DIENA in Latvian 25 Jul 92 p 7

[Article by Janis Marsans: "Ministry of Defense Reorganization Expected"]

[Text] Special to DIENA Riga, July 24. Monday, DIENA was informed by Talavs Jundzis, Minister of Defense of the Republic of Latvia, that a reorganization of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Latvia is expected very soon. Formation of communications and information units, as well as a field engineer battalion are expected.

Greater attention will be focused on the creation of the Military Attache Institute. It is anticipated that the military attache division will have 4 attaches (for Lithuania, Estonia, and Russia, and well as one who will coordinate this activity). An aviation base is expected to be installed at Spilve airport, which would temporarily contain 6 UN airplanes and 6 helicopters.

In turn, a publishing house will be created under the auspices of the National Academy of Defense Forces of the Republic of Latvia, which will publish materials needed by the Ministry.

CAUCASIAN STATES

Azerbaijani Cabinet Considers Servicemen's Social Rights

92US0824A Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian 1 Aug 92 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Official Chronicles"]

[Text] The Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Azerbaijan has adopted a resolution on protection of the social rights of servicemen of foreign states living on the territory of the republic.

In accordance with this resolution, servicemen living on the territory of the republic, including those transferred to reserves or retired, will receive—free of charge and regardless of their departmental affiliation—property rights to houses and apartments where they live. Persons falling into this category are granted the right to exchange their living quarters for other accommodations outside of the republic.

If the apartment is surrendered to the state, the occupants are paid compensation in the amount of the current market value. The vacated living quarters remains in the possession of the Ministry of Defense. Heads of executive authorities are tasked with determining the value of monetary compensation. Vacated living quarters will be used to house servicemen arriving to perform their military service in our republic.

Servicemen leaving the republic will be permitted to take out their personal possessions with no limitations or customs duties.

Elchibey Holds Meeting on Creation of Army

*92US0824B Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian
5 Aug 92 p 1*

[AZERINFORM report: "Presidential Conference"]

[Text] On 3 August an all-republic conference was held by the Azerbaijan president's staff at the initiative of Minister of Defense Rahim Kaziyeu in accordance with a decision of the Defense Council; the subject was military organizational development and the adoption of a concrete course of action in this area. Among those invited to participate were members of the Azerbaijan's National Assembly, top officials of ministries and government agencies, state advisers, high-ranking members of the president's staff, heads of the executive branch, military commissioners, chiefs of administrations and departments of internal affairs, and city and rayon procurators.

Azerbaijan President Abulfaz Elchibey presided at the conference.

In his opening remarks he said that one of the main attributes of an independent state, among others, is having its own efficient army. For independent Azerbaijan, along with the task of building a new government structure, a priority task is to create a national army. Our republic is forced to place special significance on this in the face of external aggression. Lately neighboring countries have been doing everything to deprive Azerbaijan of the ability to create an efficient army capable of defending its land. According to A. Elchibey, the creation of the Azerbaijani army has been carried out in several stages. The Azerbaijani army, which at first was formed on the volunteer principle, is currently manned about equally by volunteers and draftees. Speaking of the current situation at the front and providing all that is necessary for the army, the president emphasized that all power structures in the republic should be involved in

these matters. The purpose of the current conference is to exchange opinions and adopt a definite plan of measures directed at the accelerated creation of an efficient national army.

Those speaking at the conference noted that after the government of popular confidence came to power, the situation in the republic became relatively stable. At the same time, at the local level there is no clear plan or well-defined interaction between the organs of the authorities and administrative organs with respect to manning and supply of the army. As a result, according to the speakers, there are occasions of draftees leaving the area of combat action without authorization; there are groups that do not obey the general command. The majority of the speakers noted that without establishing discipline and acting in accordance with the demands of the time of war against those who avoid service, one cannot hope for a quick victory over the enemy.

After a lengthy discussion it was decided to summarize all the proposals and suggestions and to put together a plan of concrete actions with respect to coordinating the actions of all organs of authority.

Among those participating in the conference were Chairman of the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet Isa Gambarov, State Secretary Panakh Guseynov, First Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Tamerlan Karayev, Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Afiyaddin Dzhililov, First Deputy Prime Minister Vagid Akhmedov, and Deputy Prime Minister Firudin Dzhililov.

Press Conference held on Creation of Azerbaijani Navy

*92US0824C Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian
7 Aug 92 p 3*

[Report by S. Gadzhiyev: "Happy Birthday, Navy!"]

[Text] A few days ago the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Azerbaijan held a press conference for Azerbaijani and foreign journalists; the subject was the creation of Azerbaijan's own Navy.

The birth of the navy is an event of immense historic importance. As was emphasized at the press conference, 26 July—the day when the tricolor flag of our state was flown by the ships transferred to Azerbaijan's jurisdiction—should be regarded as the official birthday of the Azerbaijani Navy.

The press conference was held by a group of the republic's Navy Command representatives, headed by Acting Fleet Commander, Captain 1st Rank R. Askerov.

The journalists were especially interested in the announcement regarding the establishment of sea borders with neighboring states and their proper protection. It was stated that after the politicians resolve the issues

related to sea borders, the Navy will be able to ensure their inviolability and to replace the CIS formations on the sea border with Iran.

With respect to the fate of the Red Banner Red Navy personnel, the deputy fleet commander, Captain 2d Rank Z. Aliyev, said that those 40 percent of officers and warrant officers serving in Baku who expressed a desire to be transferred to the Azerbaijani Navy are being provided with all amenities for normal living and work. It is gratifying to see that among them are not only Azeris but also Russians, Lezgins, and other nationalities.

The journalists were also given video materials prepared by the film-making group of the center for information and analysis of the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense. These materials show incidents of vandalism and lawlessness committed by some navy personnel leaving Azerbaijan. Among other things, they attempt to take whatever they can with them, and the rest they destroy or disable.

An issue that remains of principal and topical importance is the fate of the 23d Military Ship Repair Yard that still remains under Russian jurisdiction; the owners are secretly shipping out containers with equipment without which it will be impossible to perform ship repairs.

Criminal proceedings have been initiated against those responsible for these illegal actions; one of them has left the territory of the republic.

Azerbaijani Decree Creates Territorial Defense Staffs

92US0824D Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian
11 Aug 92 p 1

["Decree of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan: On the Creation of Territorial Defense Staffs"]

[Text] For the purpose of improving the handling of defense matters on the local level, I resolve:

1. To create territorial defense staffs in rayons and cities of the Republic of Azerbaijan under the chief executives.
2. To establish that territorial defense staffs are headed by the chief executive.
3. To establish that the permanent members of the territorial defense staff be comprised, in accordance with their position, of the chief of the respective rayon or city police, the head of the territorial department of the Ministry of National Security, the military commissioner, and the procurator. In addition, commanders of military units stationed on the territory in question are considered members of the staff.

[Signed] President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Abulfaz Elchibey
Baku, 7 August 1992

Decree Prolongs Azerbaijan's Draft

92US0824E Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian
14 Aug 92 p 1

["Decree of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan: On Extending the Period for Drafting Republic of Azerbaijan Citizens for Fixed-Term Military Service"]

[Text] To extend the draft period established in Decree No. 686 of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan "On Drafting Republic of Azerbaijan Citizens for Fixed-Term Military Service in April-June 1992 and on Transferring to the Reserves Privates, Seamen, Sergeants, and Senior NCO's Who Have Completed the Required Term of Military Service" from 17 April of this year to 30 August of this year.

[Signed] President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Abulfaz Elchibey
Baku, 11 August 1992

Directive on Fight Against Draft Dodging

92US0829C Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian
28 Aug 92 p 1

[Directive: "Directive of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan on Measures to Strengthen the Fight Against Avoidance of Military Service in the Republic of Azerbaijan"]

[Text] Under the conditions where all of the efforts and possibilities of our people are mobilized to free our lands from the Armenian bandits and furious battles are being waged for the territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the strengthening of the fight against avoidance of military service and mobilization and against desertion is one of the important conditions for victory. Whereas the self-sacrificing sons and daughters of the homeland are giving examples of true heroism, cases of avoidance of military service in the ranks of the armed forces should be characterized as the refusal of persons committing these offenses to perform the duty foreseen by the Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

For the purpose of preventing citizens from avoiding regular call-ups to active military service and mobilization and also to strengthen the fight against cases of desertion in the ranks of the army, I decree:

1. Within 1 week the ministries of defense and internal affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan should present the appropriate plan of measures prepared jointly with the procurator's office of the republic for the purpose of the timely revelation of cases of avoidance of military service, their registration, and the prompt preparation on the basis of these facts of materials for transmission to the rayon and military procurator's offices.
2. The procurator's office of the Republic of Azerbaijan should bring to account officials establishing the conditions for the avoidance of military service in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

3. The Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Azerbaijan should provide for the timely review of criminal cases of this category in rayon and city people's courts and military tribunals of the republic.

4. The coordination of local actions to stop cases of avoidance of the call-up of citizens to active military service and mobilization as well as avoidance of military service should be assigned to the territorial defense staffs established under rayon and city executive authority.

5. It is recommended that the state television and radio broadcasting company of the Republic of Azerbaijan and other mass media with the participation of judicial agencies broadly cover cases of the bringing to account of persons avoiding military service. "It is necessary to establish an atmosphere of intolerance toward such citizens.

6. Control over the execution of this directive is assigned to the adviser to the president of the Republic of Azerbaijan on defense matters and to state advisers on legal and humanitarian policy.

[Signed] President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Abulfaz Elchibey
Baku, 25 August 1992

Further Details on Georgian Helicopter Incident

92UM1474A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
19 Sep 92 p 1

[Article by Vladimir Gavrilenko of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: "War is Terrible, But it is Twice as Bad When the Blows Land on Civilians"]

[Text] *The last issue of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA published a statement from the Russian Ministry of Defense press service. The title of the feature speaks for itself: "The Name of the Pilot Who Attacked the 'Kometa' Has Been Established." Yes, the discussion concerns the piratical attack of a helicopter on a hydrofoil passenger ship. This happened in the approaches to Sochi. The results were tragic—eleven wounded and one killed...*

There is information that the helicopter is Georgian. The Georgians, however, are furiously disputing that. First Tengiz Sigua, and then Tengiz Kitovani, declared that the helicopter supposedly went off in the direction of Sochi and landed there somewhere. The conclusion suggests itself. If it flew off in the direction of Sochi and landed there, that means it was piloted by a Russian. Tengiz Kitovani is stating energetically that the Georgians have "incontrovertible proof." One would like to know what that would be...

The last name of the pilot has meanwhile been ascertained—Maysuradze. There is not, and has not been, a pilot with that name in the Air Forces of the ZakVO [Transcaucasus Military District]. I was moreover permitted to hear a tape at the Ministry of Defense of Russia that recorded the conversations of the helicopter

pilot with the ground service of the Russian Air Forces. I cite it here in the form that it was transferred into my notebook. With certain omissions—you will understand which.

Ground service: Noise, static: "...second, Gagra, Leselidze and along the shore, and in the area of the mountains..." (noise, unintelligible), "...yes..." (unintelligible)... "will anyone carry this out?"

Helicopter: Roar of engine, static. A young, hearty voice, in Russian, with a strong accent: "Fine, everything fine. No damage. The crew is fine. Only on board, ah, took the wounded from there and everything..." (further, as was clarified for me, in Georgian, unintelligible). "I'll give you the mission, when I come in..." (This again in Russian). "The military..." (strong expletive) "...talking nonsense..." (unintelligible) "living here, in Georgia, I'll take them hostage..." (expletive) "for their deeds..." (more bad language).

Report of the **ground service** to the command: "The commander communicated again, berated us with foul language... I, he says, will now take the families of Russians in Georgia hostage. All this accompanied by swearing."

Helicopter: I have received the order from the command. If you... (unintelligible) "...I will destroy it! Everything!"

Ground service: "You should coordinate your actions with us."

Helicopter: "I understand... but you" (unintelligible). "So I will destroy it! Everything!"

Ground service: "Be more tactful, you are a combat pilot!"

Helicopter: "I am a combat pilot, and you" (expletive) "talking nonsense..." (expletive).

There is the conversation. Mr. Kitovani can also hear it if he wants.

It is clear that a modern-day barbarian is at the controls. Cruel, blinded by national hostility. Such a little Führer on a local scale, granting himself the right to dispose of the fates of people. The Russians living in Georgia. For their deeds, don't you see. Which ones?

This is very alarming—a weapon, and moreover such a terrible one, in the hands of a pirate. And there are such not only in Georgia. Everywhere that there are wars going on, which we modestly call interethnic conflicts. Under various banners. Under various ideas. But their essence is one thing—people are annihilating people, it looks like, obeying the savage instincts of hatred. War is grief and great misfortune always and everywhere. But when it is waged even this way, and then justified by politicians, the pain and alarm are doubled.

So it turns out that there is something to justify barbarism in the air and on the ground? Kill and take hostages, bomb and strafe peaceful cities and towns, attack rest homes and passengers vessels...

And international law, and the norms of civilization?

It would be interesting to know what the chairman of the State Council of Georgia, Eduard Shevardnadze—in the recent past a highly placed diplomat with a world name and a frenzied supporter of international law—thinks on this score.

Someone with a quick temper will perhaps try to reproach the author for anti-Georgian sentiments. I did not, and do not, have any. And I never will. The discussion is about something else. About the unacceptability and impermissibility of the inhumanity that we do not have the right to forgive even for simple barbarians of any nationality.

CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

Uzbekistan Adopts Law on Defense

92UM1484A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 7 Aug 92 p 3

[Report by Semen Novoprudskiy under the rubric "Uzbekistan": "The Republic Has Forbidden Itself to Start a War First"]

[Text]

The Law on Defense Is Sufficiently Defensive

The Law on Defense went into effect yesterday in Uzbekistan. From now on Uzbekistan's military doctrine will be based on the principle of defense adequacy, and for this purpose the law legally registers the absence of any sort of territorial claims on other countries and the rejection of war as a means of resolving international problems.

The Uzbek army will be manned as the Soviet army was. That is, based on universal military duty. There is to be no party element in the forces. There will be no supreme commander in chief in peacetime. His functions will be assumed by various institutions of authority. The president has been granted authority to appoint the minister of defense, approve plans for military development and confer military ranks. The parliament approves the president's decisions, and the Ministry of Defense exercises operational management of the forces.

The president is instructed to assume command of the army in time of war and to declare war in case Uzbekistan is attacked from outside. The country's armed forces will include an air force, air defense forces, ground forces and a National Guard. The military will have a numerical strength of around 25,000-30,000. The military oath approved by the parliament at its latest session is presently being administered in the republic. The

National Guard has already taken the oath. The law contains no stipulations regarding the status of Commonwealth troops on the territory of Uzbekistan. This will apparently be defined in a bilateral agreement between Uzbekistan and the commander in chief of the Commonwealth OVS [Unified Armed Forces]. Commonwealth officers will not take the oath of allegiance to Uzbekistan but will continue their allegiance to the oath they took when they began serving. People without citizenship will not be drafted into the Uzbek army.

Turkmenistan Official on Alternative Service

92UM1484C Ashgabat TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA
in Russian 5 Sep 92 p 2

[Interview with F.S. Popandopulo, department head in Turkmenistan's Ministry of Defense, by NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent: "What Is Alternative Service?"]

[Text] Induction centers have opened in the communities and districts. The spring induction is underway. Alternative (labor) service is a new feature of this military draft. How does it differ from regular military service, and who has this option? These and other questions posed by our correspondent are answered by F.S. Popandopulo, section chief in Turkmenistan's Ministry of Defense.

[Popandopulo] The decree "On the Introduction of Alternative Service on the Territory of Turkmenistan" was signed by the President of Turkmenistan on 14 July. Only individuals whose state of health renders them suitable for military service are inducted for alternative service, the same as for service in the regular units. Far from everyone is allowed to choose this kind of service, however. A choice is granted to the following categories of conscripts:

- draftees who are legally married and have one child;
- draftees who are the oldest son in a family with five or more other children;
- draftees with a single parent who is in disability Group 3, regardless of whether there are other children in the family. The Law on Universal Military Duty provides for a deferment when the only parent is in disability Group 1 or 2;
- draftees from families which have one fully able-bodied parent but have two or more children below the age of 20 years;
- draftees who are enrolled in evening or correspondence courses of a higher educational institution at the time of their induction into the army;
- draftees who have been tried and have served out a period of incarceration before they are inducted.

Conscripts in one of the categories listed make a choice between regular and alternative service. If the latter is chosen, the conscript submits a written statement to that effect and signs a binding contract. I shall discuss that in detail.

This is done so that servicemen performing alternative service always have a sense of responsibility to the army,

the Ministry of Defense and the government of Turkmenistan and so that they are disciplined and conscientious. The signing of a contract by a soldier for alternative service is the same as taking the oath in the regular army. Among other things, it specifies the following:

- the date for reporting to the designated site;
- that the Constitution and the laws of Turkmenistan are to be observed;
- that the internal routine in industry is to be observed;
- that personal qualifications are to be continuously improved;
- that the job is to be performed in good time and well;
- that property in industry is to be treated with care.

There are several other points defining the terms of alternative service for the fightingman in industry. Failure to fulfill or a violation of any one of them entails full liability under the law. The term of alternative service is set at two years, unlike service in regular military units, in which the servicemen now serve only a year and a half. If a soldier does not come to work and does not have a valid excuse, the days he is absent do not count, and his service term is extended.

The government of Turkmenistan has decreed that fightingmen will perform alternative service only at state enterprises. For this conscription these will be establishments and enterprises of the ministries of health, construction, agriculture and food of Turkmenistan. Servicemen performing alternative service will live at home and work in a subdivision of one of these ministries. If a serviceman has acquired a specialty prior to his induction every effort will be made to use him in precisely that field.

The fightingman performing alternative service will receive 60 percent of his earnings, with the other 40 percent going to the Ministry of Defense.

If, after serving a certain period of time, a serviceman performing alternative service states that he wishes to transfer to a regular army unit, the period of time he has served is nullified and his term of service in the other branch is calculated anew.

The introduction of alternative service provides a choice for young families, large families and families with small incomes. They like the idea of receiving most of their earnings, as well as bonuses granted for good performance and all sorts of one-time payments, while living at home, and being able to fulfill certain domestic duties in the family, of course. The service term is longer, though.

At the same time everything possible has been done to see that the alternative service proceeds in an organized manner and to make it possible for the serviceman to fulfill all of his obligations without bringing shame to the army or his family.

One can obtain information on all of the pluses and minuses of alternative (labor) service at the military

commissariats prior to induction, and the induction centers will provide it for every youth when he meets with the commission so that he can make the right choice.

Turkmenistan Military Appointments

92UM1484D Ashgabat TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA
in Russian 5 Sep 92 p 1

[Turkmen Press report: "Official Chronicle"]

[Text] President of Turkmenistan S.A. Niyazov has decreed:

That Major-General Annamurat Soltanov is appointed chief of staff and first deputy minister of defense of Turkmenistan;

That Major-General Begdzhn Khakimovich Niyazov is appointed deputy minister of defense of Turkmenistan;

That Major-General Viktor Mikhaylovich Zavarzin is appointed chief of staff and first deputy commander of the Separate Combined-Arms Army of Turkmenistan;

That Major-General Ilaman Yelbarsov is appointed first deputy commander of the Separate Combined-Arms Army of Turkmenistan;

That Major-General Konstantin Borisovich Pulikovskiy is appointed first deputy commander of the Separate Combined-Arms Army of Turkmenistan.

Lieutenant-General Nikolay Viktorovich Kormiltsev is appointed commander of the Separate Combined-Arms Army and deputy minister of defense of Turkmenistan by a decree of President of Turkmenistan S.A. Niyazov.

The rank of major-general is conferred upon Ilaman Yelbarsov by a decree of President of Turkmenistan S.A. Niyazov.

The rank of major-general is conferred upon colonels Vladimir Ibragimovich Bayramov, Nikolay Yevgenyevich Rogozhkin and Valeriy Karapetovich Khachatryan.

Galina Mikhaylovna Shpak is appointed first deputy chairman of Akhal Oblast, and Karabay Nazarov and Khakmurad Orazmuradov are appointed deputy chairmen of that oblast by a decree of President of Turkmenistan S.A. Niyazov.

Batyr Kurbanovich Sardzhayev is appointed mayor of the city of Ashgabat by decree of President of Turkmenistan S.A. Niyazov.

Serdar Babayev, Tuvakbibi Kurbanovna Durdyeva, Ernest Tikhonovich Kovkov and Maral Mukhamedovna Muradova are appointed deputy mayors of the city of Ashgabat by decree of President of Turkmenistan S.A. Niyazov.

Khamida Atayevna Atayeva is appointed chairman of Leninskiy Rayon in the city of Ashgabat, Kakadzhani Avliyevich Ovezov is appointed chairman of Sovetskiy Rayon in the city of Ashgabat, and Yuriy Borisovich Serikov is appointed chairman of Proletarskiy Rayon in the city of Ashgabat by decree of President of Turkmenistan S.A. Niyazov.

Ilmurad Bayramov is appointed mayor of the city of Buzmeyin, and the following are appointed chairmen of rayons: Nurmurad Atayev, Tedzhenskiy; Annakuli Melyayev, Gekdepinskiy; Karabay Meredov, Babadaykhanskiy; Akhmet Mukhiyev, Sarakhsskiy; Tagandury Nuryyev, Kakinskiy; Shikhmurad Khudaykuliyyev, Bakherdenskiy.

ARMS TRADE

German T-72's Sold to Finland

92UM1463B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 15 Sep 92 p 3

[Unattributed report under the "Foreign Military News" rubric: "Former GDR Tanks Delivered to Finland"]

[Text] Finland has started to receive deliveries of combat materiel purchased this summer in Germany.

The German ship Amke arrived at the port of Pori to unload 50 T-72 tanks that had previously been in service in the GDR Army. Another lot, one of 47 tanks, is to arrive in the near future from Rostock. The newspaper HELSINGIN SANOMAT reports that the contract includes deliveries of artillery weapons, small arms, and ammunition. The total value of the deal, which was concluded with the German Ministry of Defense in June, amounts to about 150 million Finnish marks.

DEFENSE INDUSTRY

Ukraine's Military Industry Minister Antonov Interviewed

92UM1489A Moscow EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN
in Russian No 27 Jul 92 p 6

[Interview with Viktor Ivanovich Antonov, minister of Machinebuilding, Military-Industrial Complex and Conversion of Ukraine, by EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN correspondent Yuriy Kornev, date, place and occasion not specified, under rubric "Military-Industrial Complex in Light of Economics and Politics": "Conversion: A Person Against the Background of the Problem"; photograph of Antonov appears in article]

[Text] *The military-industrial complex was given all the best there was in our country—people, technologies, land, resources, scientific potential. No assets were spared for "protecting achievements of the Great October." People were undernourished, lived in communal apartments, and wore whatever they had, but "they strengthened the country's defense."*

But we will not be hypocritical; the former Soviet Union's military-industrial complex did not just frighten the whole world, it made an enormous contribution to fascism's defeat by peoples of the anti-Hitler coalition. It forced the West to seek new approaches to world destinies.

Ukraine possesses the second military industrial potential after Russia among CIS countries. And one of the brightest "stars" of our republic military-industrial complex is Viktor Antonov. Let us listen to what this well-known organizer of defense production, scientist, State Prize laureate, and now minister has to say.

[Kornev] Viktor Ivanovich, what does Ukraine's military-industrial complex represent?

[Antonov] It is 70 plants and over a million highly skilled workers, engineers and technicians. It is modern machine tools, equipment and technologies. It is missile and space equipment, aircraft and tank construction and shipbuilding. This is what the former military-industrial complex is. Now it is plants of Ukraine which are partially or fully engaged in producing military equipment.

[Kornev] This previously was regarded as an enormous amount of property, but now it is the other way around. What is to be done with such enormous wealth, which has become a heavy and in some cases even an unnecessary burden?

[Antonov] I will answer the question with a question. For example, what is to be done with an aircraft carrier on whose construction R800 million already have been spent and for which several tens of billions of rubles more in already current prices are needed in the next five years to complete construction? Add to this the problems with material and technical supply and set-making under conditions of an unbalanced economy and disintegrating economic ties (our shipyard deals with 2,500 enterprises of the former USSR). Therefore the only possible decision was made—to recycle the incompletely built ship, i.e., cut her up for scrap. The need for recycling also lies in the fact that all docks are taken up with incomplete ships and there is nowhere to lay down civilian vessels. But yards must be shifted to civilian products; build dry-cargo ships, trawlers, supertankers, ships for transporting passenger cars, containerships. At other yards we will build patrol ships, small frigates, and surface effect ships for guarding the coastline.

[Kornev] Are there any estimates as to how much money is needed to transfer Ukraine's military-industrial complex to a civilian footing?

[Antonov] In 1992 alone we should have directed around R140 billion for these purposes, but only R30 billion have been planned due to a shortage of monetary resources. Where is this money being directed? First of all to social protection: wages, respecializing and retraining, benefits, upkeep of the social sphere. Then for writing off commodities and materials, incomplete production, and finished products unsuitable for civilian use. And finally and most importantly, the reason why conversion is happening: for restructuring military production for the output of civilian products and consumer goods. Expenses for converting scientific organizations serving the military-industrial complex to the development of civilian designs are included here as well. The Ministry already has worked out 216 national programs.

One source for investing in conversion could be the assistance of capitalist countries. I believe we have the right to count on this. Was it not the United States which for long years called on us to disarm and lower the level of military confrontation? Now we have taken this path. I think that cessation of the arms race on former USSR territory freed up billions of dollars in the United States alone and a portion of this amount can be shared with the CIS.

[Kornev] Ukraine became a world power with a very large military-industrial complex overnight. It seemed to us

about three years ago that it was very simple to make frying pans instead of space ships. Now we have seen that this is not so. Perhaps it is more advantageous for Ukraine to remain a weapons producer and sell them abroad? Perhaps it is more advantageous to sell arms and buy frying pans with the dollars netted?

[Antonov] We are a civilized state, and it is somehow inappropriate for us to engage in direct military business.

[Kornev] But all civilized countries engage in this although they consider themselves humane.

[Antonov] Yes, that is so, and I believe Ukraine may continue mutually advantageous cooperation in this direction with a country such as India, which the former Soviet Union traditionally supplied with military equipment systems, including naval ships with all the "filling." There are Chinese proposals to manufacture some kind of spare parts for old equipment. We also will do this, but we do not plan to specially build the economy and business on military equipment. This is first of all. Secondly, Ukraine's military-industrial complex is the most modern part of the former USSR's military industry in level of equipment, in recently created capital assets, and in qualifications of workers and engineers. Therefore we believe they must be used for manufacturing equipment and replenishing the market with commodities. This is the most important task.

[Kornev] But it also was posed in the initial period of so-called perestroika. Nothing came of such a conversion concept, although M. Gorbachev very much hoped that this will help saturate the market quickly with various commodities.

[Antonov] Yes, but no one reduced expenditures for the Army at that time. They even increased somewhat over the last six years. But now, when we have seen that our filling of consumer goods is 10 kopecks for one ruble of wages, that inflation is growing, and that production volumes are decreasing, we realized more acutely that without filling the ruble or the future grivna with a mass of commodities, there is no reason to speak of any kind of improvement of the economy. If we do not do this, life simply will come to a standstill.

[Kornev] What can be said about prospects for joint-stock ownership and privatization in defense sectors?

[Antonov] Over half of Ukraine's 700 defense enterprises can be privatized, but not all of them. I see such plants as Kiev Arsenal and Dnepropetrovsk Yuzhmash as state enterprises for the foreseeable future if there are units in the Ukrainian Armed Forces outfitted with our military equipment. We have many radiotechnical plants which can be privatized today. Plants of the former Ministry of Machine Building for Light and Food Industry and Household Appliances were included in the military-industrial complex. Already today they can be sold into private hands.

[Kornev] What will be the future of your ministry? Does it not plan to reorganize into some kind of corporation handling the military-industrial complex and conversion?

[Antonov] I have no direct influence on or relationship with industry today. Our ministry is purely a state entity which carries out three tasks: structural perestroika of the sector, state order for military equipment, and coordination of the national program for retooling other sectors—metallurgy, the agro-industrial complex, and public health services. But all this will be done with the help of economic controls—taxes, credit rates, and budget financing of science. I do not appoint or remove directors nor do I provide materials. If some kind of associations arise in the sector, such as four plants joining to manufacture a modern tractor, they are doing this for themselves.

[Kornev] Viktor Ivanovich, in your view, when can conversion of Ukraine's military-industrial complex provide a real return to the republic's civilian population?

[Antonov] I believe we should feel the first steps already this year. We plan to increase consumer goods production by one-third. It is proposed to significantly increase the output of medical equipment, equipment for the agro-industrial complex, and sophisticated household equipment.

Appropriate contracts were concluded with South Korea, Germany and Italy. Today, however, we need base capital in dollars, but there is none. The Donetsk Topaz Plant mastered production of video tape recorders. It needs \$48 million, and in 1993 it will produce almost a half-billion [rubles] worth of products and then will reach volumes of over two billion rubles. But appropriate equipment is needed. Today there are no such currency assets.

[Kornev] Then what kind of conversion with dollar infusion can we speak of?

[Antonov] If India, for example, really will buy spare parts and elements for previously purchased arms from us, then with these funds we will be able to buy some of the needed equipment. There is also an export program and there are opportunities to obtain foreign credits for our business plans.

[Kornev] Are there specific projects for western countries' involvement in conversion of Ukraine's military-industrial complex?

[Antonov] There is an international conversion fund for the former USSR. Its cofounders are the U.S. pension fund, General Motors, and other major companies. This fund is examining our proposals for credits for mastering the TU-334 aircraft at the Kiev Aircraft Plant in order to sell it on the world market. This is a 100-passenger aircraft with a flight range of 2,500 km, i.e., that very aircraft which the world market does not have.

The fund also plans to allocate \$30 million for development of a ceramic engine by the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. This program is directed by Academician V. I. Trefilov. In addition, we gave the fund another 15 proposals on inventions and innovations which the world market does not have.

There are very interesting proposals in shipbuilding. Rappoport, a major financier from Switzerland, and

PepsiCo wish to help renovate our yards and then sell their products jointly. There are interesting proposals by the EEC and business circles of the FRG, Canada, Australia and other countries. There are many who are willing, and therefore we are examining all proposals on a competitive basis.

[Kornev] Viktor Ivanovich, was there a conversation with CIS states to the effect that Ukraine will be an arms supplier for them?

[Antonov] I wish to reemphasize that selling arms to any aggressive countries is not in our plans. Former republics of the USSR are another matter. Posing such a task here is competent and moral. Our common military-industrial complex must be preserved—not to the full extent, naturally, but to some reduced extent. This was discussed at the last meeting of heads of CIS states held in Kiev on 20 March of this year. An economic agreement between Ukraine and Russia was signed at the ministerial level in early April.

[Kornev] How do you see Ukraine's economy in the future?

[Antonov] Transition to the market is a lengthy process. We will survive if we build a Japanese or South Korean type of economy. This means high technologies and science-intensive articles. Therefore we are thinking today about how we can keep Yuzhmash, Arsenal and other defense industry enterprises busy. We must make passenger aircraft such as the world does not have, and family helicopters. We have to move up to making passenger cars, designs that are ahead of their time, video tape recorders and video cameras, to something that the world does not yet have, and we have to make use of our scientists, engineers, and highly skilled workers. Future prosperity nevertheless is laid down in production, no matter what we say about the importance of developing the market infrastructure.

Advertisement for Igla, Igla-1 SAM Systems

92UM1475B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in English
17 Sep 92 p 4

[Advertisement: "Portable Igla and Igla-1 Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) Systems"]

[Text]

Purpose

These SAM systems destroy jet-driven, turbo-prop and propeller-driven aircraft and helicopters and some other targets on pursuit and collision courses when targets are visible.

The Igla system differs from the Igla-1 by heavier protection against natural and artificial heated jamming.

The Igla and Igla-1 systems are available with radar challenger to identify a target as friendly/hostile.

The challenger is mounted in the lower part of the launcher.

The Manufacturer gives a warranty to repair system components and to prolong their service life.

Tactical and technical data is improved every 4-6 years.

These SAM systems include:

These SAM systems include:

	Igla	Igla-1
1. Combat equipment:		
—missile	9M39	9M313
—ground power supply unit	9B238	9B238
—reusable launcher	9P516	9P519
2. Service equipment	mobile 9V866 monitoring station located on GAZ-66 motor vehicle chassis	
3. Training means	at the customer's discretion	

Tactical and technical data

1. Maximum target height, m	
a) on collision courses:	
—jet-driven aircraft	2000
—piston-engined aircraft and helicopters	3000
b) on pursuit courses:	
—jet-driven aircraft	2500
—piston-engined aircraft and helicopters	3500
2. Minimum target height, m	10
3. Target speed, m/s:	
—on collision courses	360
—on pursuit courses	320
4. Inclined destruction range, m	500-5000
5. Mean flying speed of missile, m/s	570
6. Missile caliber, mm	
—Igla	72.2
—Igla-1	72.1
7. Control system	heat-homing head
8. Time of going to readiness state, sec	13 approx.
9. Weight of system combat equipment, kg	18 approx.
10. Temperature range	40-50 C
11. Storage term	10 years

Izhevskiy Mekhanicheskiy Zavod

426063, Izhevsk

Promyshlennaya str. 8

Telephone: 75-37-35

Teletype: 255132 Shchit

Telefax: 3412765890

Izhevsk Offers Strela-10M/Z for Sale

92UM1475A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
18 Sep 92 p 2

[Article by Aleksandr Dolgikh: "The 'Strela,' Aimed at the Zenith"]

[Text] Ideally, the arsenal of the Air Defense [PVO] Troops, like all others, should include a minimum number of weapon models, only those systems which have proven in competition the highest effectiveness and superiority over others. However, the missions which PVO subunits of the Ground Forces carry out are diverse and often require weapons possessing specific characteristics. And equipment is constantly developing: one type of weapon may not yet have exhausted its service life and combat capabilities before it is being squeezed out by another more improved and general-purpose weapon. It is not surprising that the Ground Forces are equipped with several systems for combating hostile aircraft: here the Shilka, Osa, Strela, Igla, and Tunguska are still in the inventory.

The Strela-10 is considered one of the most successful air defense weapons of the Ground Troops. It is simple and convenient to use. Put very simply, you only have to "show" the missile the target and it will not miss it, regardless of what kind of evasive maneuvers and ruses the enemy uses. The Strela-10 receives target designation in the automatic mode from the air defense system of the motorized rifle or tank regiment into which it is integrated.

The main function of the Strela-10 is to combat low-flying offensive air weapons: helicopters, ground-attack aircraft, cruise missiles.

Whereas its predecessor, the Strela-1, was mounted on the base of an armored reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM), the Strela-10 has been given a tracked base that is more reliable and has a high off-road capability—the MT-LB light artillery prime mover.

The bank of launchers is designed for four missiles. The same number are carried inside the vehicle. Reloading takes only minutes. Combat launches can be made on the move and even afloat.

Basic Specifications and Performance Characteristics of the Strela-10M/Z System

Target destruction range, m	800-5000
Target destruction altitude, m	25-3500
Target speed, km/hr	up to 1500
Probability of target destruction by missile warhead	up to 0.9
Detonating device	8-pulse laser
Missile weight, kg	74
Basic load, missiles	8
Vehicle crew size	3

Recently, an improved model of the missile was accepted into service—the Strela-10M/Z. It has a passive guidance system with an optical three-band homing head. This enables the missile to identify and destroy the target without reacting to natural or manmade jamming which the enemy may generate.

It is close in combat characteristics to systems in other countries. Perhaps the main difference between the Strela-10 and, say, American or French systems is the low cost.

Today the Strela is in service in more than 30 countries of the world and is produced under license in some countries. During the combat operations in Angola, it was used to shoot down dozens of French-made Mirage fighters.

MILITARY CONFLICT, FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

India's Defense Minister On Cooperation With Russia

92UM1515A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
25 Sep 92 p 3

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA press service: "They're Counting on Russia, But They're Not Doing Too Badly Themselves"]

[Text] As Indian Defense Minister S. Pavar said in a speech in Madras, the Indian-Russian agreement on military issues will be comprehensively discussed during Russian President Boris Yeltsin's visit to India in January of next year. Touching on possible areas of cooperation between the two countries in the military sphere, the minister emphasized that his agency is currently studying the question of joint production of spare parts for military equipment provided to India earlier by the former Soviet Union. At the same time, he said, another option is being considered—the production of spare parts by India itself. In this connection, it should be pointed out that 70 percent of the Indian Army's equipment is Soviet-made. But lately the military has experienced an acute shortage of spare parts and components on account of a disruption in deliveries from Russia and other former Soviet republics.

S. Pavar also touched on a rumor making the rounds in Indian military circles to the effect that New Delhi plans to buy a contingent of Russian MIG-27 fighters. He said that such a deal is absolutely out of the question and indicated that this is due to purely financial factors.

Meanwhile, as an ITAR-TASS correspondent reports from New Delhi, Indian specialists have completed—successfully—testing of the Indian-made Lakshya unmanned aircraft. The plane tows targets to be fired on by long-range artillery and ground- and air-launched missiles. Guided from the ground, the Lakshya demonstrated a capability to fly at altitudes of 300 to 9,000

meters, to cruise at speeds of up to 750 kilometers per hour, and to remain in flight for 45 minutes. After completing its mission, the plane ejects a parachute and smoothly drops to earth in a designated location.

It is expected that the Lakshya will soon be placed in service in India's ground, air, and naval forces, making a significant contribution to enhancing the combat-readiness of its army and navy.

SECURITY SERVICES

Turkmen Border Troops Deemed Unreliable

92UM1484B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 29 Aug 92 p 1

[NEGA report under the rubric "In Brief": "The Locals Are Not Trusted"]

[Text] Eighty percent of the first-term servicemen in Turkmenistan's border troops cannot be trusted to guard the republic's state borders. This conclusion is contained in a report prepared by the personnel section of the republic's Border Troop Directorate for the new command element recently appointed by President Saparmurad Niyazov. It is the opinion of officers in the section that the main causes of this are a lack of discipline on the part of conscripts from Turkmenistan, a tendency to desert and break the law, international and intertribal conflicts.

Reinforcements for Tajik-Afghan Border

92UM1463A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Sep 92 p 3

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Valentin Astafyev: "CIS Subunits Rapidly Deployed to Tajik-Afghan Border"]

[Text] In the last few days, Russian border troops guarding the Tajik-Afghan border have experienced 16 armed encounters with violators. The border troops have lost three men. The troops are suffering a substantial manpower shortage.

This alarm has been reflected in an announcement made recently by the presidents of the four states of Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. They decided to reinforce the southern boundaries of the Commonwealth. This was made a reality on 7 September by the arrival in Termez of an operations group from the Unified Armed Forces and Border Troops of Russia headed by Colonel General Viktor Samsonov, CIS Unified Armed Forces chief of staff. Initiated on the same day to strengthen the Afghan border was a rapid deployment of troops to the Russian troops stationed there. The operation employed helicopters to carry personnel of units included in the CIS peacekeeping forces.

The writer of this article flew to Tadjikistan aboard a helicopter commanded by Captain Gennadiy Firsto. We

delivered reinforcements for a subunit. It was more or less peaceful there. A group of nine men had been detained as it attempted to cross the border the preceding evening by a neighboring subunit under Senior Lieutenant Igor Maslenkov. Confiscated from the group were 14 automatic rifles, a submachine gun, a grenade launcher, and large amount of ammunition.

Related item: ITAR-TASS reports that border subunits stationed on the Tadzhik-Afghan border have been supplied with reinforcements from Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Kazakhstan. The number of incoming troops amounts to 1,000 men.

The Operations Group Directorate of the Central Asian Border District points out that the populace of kishlaks lying near the border looks favorably on the strengthening of the southern border, considering it to be a stabilizing socio-political factor in Tajikistan.

Potential Threat from Violations of Tajik-Afghan Border

92UM1498 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Sep 92 p 1

[Article by Captain 2nd Rank Aleksandr Pelts: "The 'Transparency' of the Tajik-Afghan Border is a Threat to All the Countries of the CIS"]

[Text] A week had not even passed since I returned from the Tajik-Afghan border. But the data on the number that was in my notebook of violators detained and the weapons and ammunition seized was already hopelessly out of date.

Only the overall situation at the border itself, especially at the posts of the Pyandzh Border Detachment that I had visited, remains unchanged. Attempts to cross the border illegally continue one after another. The border troops moreover note with alarm the approach, as they themselves say, of a "second wave" of mass movements. And the facts confirm it. The alert groups raise the signal every night. The border guards get into dangerous confrontations with the brazen violators several times. The Russian border guards detained 33 citizens of Tajikistan returning from the Afghan shore of the Pyandzh last Saturday alone.

The alarming situation at the Tajik-Afghan border, as is well known, has forced the taking of a series of extreme steps to reinforce the border. Russia, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have sent additional forces to aid the border guards. The uneasiness of the states of the CIS is entirely understandable—the "transparency" of the Tajik-Afghan border directly threatens them with a stream of weapons, ordnance and drugs.

Even a substantial reinforcement of the guard, however, provides no firm grounds to say—as was the case before—that the border is solidly locked up. The very

situation in Tajikistan itself, torn since May by bloody conflicts, has changed. It is not only the weapons couriers who are crossing the border home, but also the local inhabitants, who know the border and the border guards themselves very well. They gather in small groups of 5—10 people, wait for a convenient instance, literally cut through the border obstacles and... dissolve among their native towns.

The commander of the border detachment, Colonel Ravil Mullayanov, and a representative of the operations directorate of the border troops of Russia and Tajikistan, Colonel Igor Kharkovchuk, told me all of this with bitterness. Each has served on the border for more than fifteen years, and they know the local conditions thoroughly. But they acknowledge that it is very difficult to guard the border today. The violators open fire on the border guards pursuing them virtually every time with the weapons they are carrying across the border. "Many have started to look on us as the wolf. There are also open threats of reprisals against those who took part in clashes with the violators," says border post chief Captain Sergey Shumikhin.

The so-called non-contact method of transferring weapons and contraband has also become a novel "innovation." The weapons are left, by mutual agreement, in secret places or even simply in dense stands of reeds. Then workers who have obtained permission from the local authorities to work on the engineering service lines along the border send them along.

The "profit" from such deals is obvious. The cost of the weapons in Afghanistan fluctuates, but one can in practice get an automatic weapon for 5,000—7,000. The price of an automatic weapon is already reaching 100,000 rubles in the area of Kurgan-Tyube, a little more than a hundred kilometers from the border, where bloody clashes continue.

Features have been appearing in some central publications, by the way, asserting that the border guards themselves are setting up channels (for a large recompense, naturally) for the transfer of weaponry and ammunition to the opposing groups. I will not analyze the proof for such assertions. I will only emphasize that yes, channels for transfer are being set up. But not the ones that some may be dreaming of. A group was created at the suggestion of the border guards, from among prestigious and respected local people, that has the authority to appeal to its countrymen who are waiting on the Afghan side of the Pyandzh for the right moment to cross the border. It has been guaranteed to all of them that in the event of voluntary surrender, they will not be prosecuted and can return home peacefully at a designated place. Without weapons, naturally. The group went out to the shore area, but soon, referring to the plague of dust, left.

And there is another instructive fact. The length of the border of the Pyandzh Border Detachment is large. The alert groups literally tear along run-down roads to the

place of the next breakthrough—every minute counts. But if the road passes through a town, barriers often rise up in the way. The local authorities explain their appearance with the alarming situation in the region and fear of the revolutionary fighters. By the time you get around a few such obstacles, it turns out that there is simply no one to detain. It is, after all, just a few hundred meters to the border with Afghanistan or, if you go the other way, to the closest Tajik town...

Attempts to actually "buy" the border guards, meanwhile, have occurred and continue to occur. The amounts cited are enormous. In the event of refusal they are offered a "barter" deal—a leopard skin, a truckload of meat, a milk truck with alcoholic beverages, gold...

Recent events at the border, despite the continued breakthroughs, are encouraging nonetheless. The thousand airborne troops that have arrived from Kazakhstan have made a weighty contribution to its protection. A meeting was also held the other day between the command of the detachment and representatives of the Afghanistan side, who expressed a readiness to collaborate with the Russian border guards in fighting contraband. The Afghans are officially obligated to transfer to Tajikistan some violators who were captured in Afghanistan in the course of battles with Abdulatifa groups, and in the event of repeated violations of the border on the part of citizens of Tajikistan they will be met by small-arms fire. These new agreements cannot help but gladden them, since it has long since ceased to be a secret, at least to the border guards, that there are at least three centers for the training of fighters for Tajikistan on the territory of Afghanistan. Their precise locations are known—Sari-Tsul, Samingak and Bamian—along with the names of the commanders. A power struggle has broken out once again in the northern regions of Afghanistan, however. The adherents of Hekmatiyar are suffering defeat. The new forces evidently intend to establish more reliable control over their own border.

The situation, however, remains in general as difficult as before. These are the data for September 22, according to precise reports. Some 265 people were detained over five months in the sector of the Pyandzh Border Detachment, and 92 automatic weapons, 36 pistols, 7 grenade launchers, 17 machineguns, 260 grenades and several thousand rounds of ammunition were seized.

Internal Troops Transferred South

92UM1517A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 Sep 92 p 2

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Kudryashov and Major Vitaliy Strugovets: "There's More Order, But Internal Troops' Arrival in Russia's Southern Regions Draws Mixed Reaction"]

[Text] As KRSNAYA ZVEZDA has already reported, by order of the RF President, reinforcements of the RF Ministry of Internal Affairs Internal Troops have been

sent to Russia's southern regions. Their mission is to prevent the smuggling of arms from the Transcaucasus into Russia.

According to reports received by the Internal Troops Commander of the Main Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs the attitude of the local population to the Internal Troops servicemen who have arrived in the republics and krais of the Northern Caucasus to carry out service and combat missions to maintain public order is generally favorable. Local residents hope that the troops' introduction in the region will stabilize the situation and ensure that events develop peacefully. This is evidenced by, among other things, a statement by the leadership of the Republic of Dagestan Ministry of Internal Affairs conceding that street crime has declined lately in the areas where the Internal Troops reinforcements have been deployed.

As they work to maintain public order, the personnel of the Internal Troops subunits, in conjunction with police officers, are carrying out measures to confiscate weapons and to inspect motor vehicles. In Kabardino-Balkariya, for example, on September 22 alone, 35 citizens were detained for various offenses, and two revolvers, an assault rifle, an F-1 grenade, and a gas pistol were confiscated from them. Also confiscated was nearly half a kilogram of a narcotic substance.

On September 24, 99 persons were detained. Two hunting rifles and a pistol were confiscated from them.

However, not everyone has greeted the Internal Troops' arrival in the same way. In Nalchik on September 24, at a rally in defense of Yuriy Shanibov, chairman of the Confederation of Caucasus Mountain Peoples, it was demanded that Internal Troops be withdrawn from Kabardino-Balkariya. The Unity movement, which operates in Dagestan, has taken the same position.

Note: On September 23 in Nalchik, an operations officer of the Russian Ministry of Security was taken hostage (for understandable reasons, we are not releasing his name). According to information provided to the newspaper through channels of the RF Ministry of Security public relations center, it has been learned that the hostage has now been released.

Understandably, the following question arises: Isn't the hostage incident linked with the recent arrest of CCMP [Confederation of Caucasian Mountain People's] chairman Yuriy Shanibov? A competent source in the Russian Ministry of Security reported that the Ministry of Security was not involved in Shanibov's arrest. The RF Ministry of Security officer said that the CCMP chairman's arrest was handled by the Russian General Procuracy.

20 MVD Troops Wounded in Kabardino-Balkaria

92UM1519B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 29 Sep 92 p 1

[Report by Vitaliy Strugovets: "Nalchik: Around 20 of the Russian MVD's Internal Troops Wounded, Situation Intensifies"]

[Text] A state of emergency was declared in Nalchik, the capital of Kabardino-Balkaria, at 24:00 on 27 September. This was prompted by disturbances following a series of meetings held in the city in defense of Musa Shakhibov, president of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, by the prosecutor general of Russia. Agitated groups from the meetings, armed with sticks, chains, metal rods and Molotov cocktails, repeatedly attempted to capture the buildings housing the republic's government and Supreme Soviet during 26 September.

At 16:15 on 26 September a crowd of approximately 800 attempted to storm the republic television center, and 400 MVD personnel were immediately dispatched to guard it. The crowd peppered the building with stones and captured several assault rifles and pistols and an armored personnel carrier from the police.

At approximately 20:00 the supporters of the KGNK [Congress of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus] dispersed, leaving a tent camp and several dozen people in the city's central square. It was reported in the MVD duty unit in Kabardino-Balkaria that by midnight the tents had been removed from the square, the rally participants had dispersed and all of the weapons except the pistols had been returned.

On the night of 26 September subunits of internal troops of Russia's MVD were brought in from North Ossetia, Dagistan and areas and oblasts of the North Caucasus. The television center, the government building, other administrative and national economic facilities were taken under control in Nalchik. Key road and railway approaches to the republic capital are also being guarded.

Despite the arrival of additional subunits of internal troops, however, order was not restored in the city. Throughout the day crowds of people again attempted to capture the buildings housing the government and the Supreme Soviet. Nor did they calm down following a meeting with the republic's President Valeriy Kokov, who was forced under pressure from the rally participants to promise that the internal troops of the Russian Federation's MVD would be withdrawn from Kabardino-Balkaria.

We have been informed by the press center of Russia's internal troops that the behavior of the local police was no better. They practically refused to carry out their duties with respect to maintaining order. As a result the entire burden fell upon the internal troops. Under the pressure of the circumstances, according to information we obtained at the Main Directorate of Internal Troops of the Russian Federation's MVD, they were forced to open fire into the air. Even this did not have a sobering-up effect upon the attackers, however, who were making active use of stones and Molotov cocktails.

Around 20 servicemen were wounded. Some of them are in serious condition. One female rally participant was also wounded in the head by a shot from the crowd.

According to a report from the internal troops' press center, the situation in Nalchik was still tense on the morning of 28 September. According to an ITAR-TASS report, however, the order imposing a state of emergency in Nalchik was cancelled under an agreement reached with the leaders of the Kabardino People's Congress. The Kabardino People's Congress lifted the blockade of the Nalchik airport.

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